ECCouncil 312-50v13 (Certified Ethical Hacker v13) Practice Test 10

Question 90

The assessor flags this situation for follow-up: A download endpoint accepts a filename with parent-directory components and reads outside its intended folder. Select the most appropriate action.

  1. Use safe text APIs and trusted sanitization instead of unsafe DOM HTML insertion.
  2. Require exact approved redirect URIs and validate OAuth state and PKCE as appropriate.
  3. Resolve and constrain paths to an approved root and use object identifiers instead of raw filesystem paths.
  4. Allowlist writable fields for each endpoint and enforce ownership and role restrictions.
  5. Treat retrieved content as untrusted data and enforce tool permissions and output validation outside the model.
  6. Allowlist specific trusted origins and avoid wildcard or reflected credentialed origin permissions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Traversal occurs when user-controlled paths escape the allowed base directory after unsafe normalization; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that boundary tests cannot retrieve files above or outside the configured download directory.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DOM XSS arises when client-side code sends attacker-controlled values into dangerous browser sinks; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a browser script copies a URL fragment into innerHTML without a round trip through the server, rather than the path traversal protection finding described here.

B:

Open redirect registration can misdeliver authorization responses or codes outside the intended client origin; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where an authentication broker accepts an attacker-specified redirect destination when issuing authorization responses, rather than the path traversal protection finding described here.

D:

Mass assignment arises when untrusted request fields bind directly to sensitive model properties; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a profile update API accepts an undocumented isAdmin property and writes it to the user record, rather than the path traversal protection finding described here.

E:

Indirect prompt injection places adversarial instructions in lower-trust content that a language model may incorrectly treat as authority; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a web assistant begins following instructions embedded in a retrieved document instead of the user's authorized request, rather than the path traversal protection finding described here.

F:

Unsafe CORS policies may let untrusted websites read authenticated cross-origin responses in browsers; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where an API reflects arbitrary Origin headers while permitting browsers to include credentials in cross-origin requests, rather than the path traversal protection finding described here.

Question 91

A client-approved assessment includes this finding: A server alert reports unauthorized changes to local system files that were not visible on the network sensor. What is the most precise security term for it?

  1. Host intrusion detection
  2. Network IDS visibility
  3. Honeypot deception telemetry
  4. Encrypted channel inspection limitation

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Host-based detection uses operating-system events and file state to reveal activities inside endpoints; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to deploy protected endpoint telemetry and monitor high-value files and local privileges, verified when local and centralized event records show the unauthorized change with host identity and timestamp.

Incorrect Answers

B:

An IDS detects or reports activity while remaining outside the active traffic-blocking decision path; this different classification would fit when a passive network sensor raises an alert about suspicious packets but does not terminate the connection, not the evidence pointing to host intrusion detection in the question.

C:

A honeypot acts as a controlled decoy and generates high-signal alerts when unexpected interaction occurs; this different classification would fit when an isolated system with no business users receives unauthorized login attempts from an unknown source, not the evidence pointing to host intrusion detection in the question.

D:

Without authorized decryption or endpoint visibility, encrypted application content is opaque to passive perimeter inspection; this different classification would fit when a perimeter appliance detects destination addresses but cannot see threats hidden inside end-to-end encrypted payloads, not the evidence pointing to host intrusion detection in the question.

Question 92

During the permitted engagement, this note appears: A browser extension can read an authentication cookie because the cookie lacks appropriate client-side protections. What does the note principally represent?

  1. Session fixation
  2. Exposed session cookie
  3. Sensitive cookie SameSite policy
  4. Cross-site request forgery

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

An accessible session token can be replayed to impersonate an authenticated browser session if stolen; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to protect session cookies with HttpOnly and Secure attributes and enforce TLS transport, verified when browser inspection shows the session cookie is not script-readable and is sent only over HTTPS.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Failure to rotate session identifiers on privilege change can let a preselected identifier bind to an authenticated session; this different classification would fit when a user keeps the same session identifier after authentication that was assigned before login, not the evidence pointing to exposed session cookie in the question.

C:

SameSite controls when browsers attach cookies to cross-site requests, reducing some ambient-authentication abuse; this different classification would fit when a cross-site navigation unexpectedly includes a privileged session cookie in a request to an internal application, not the evidence pointing to exposed session cookie in the question.

D:

CSRF abuses ambient browser credentials when the application fails to verify the user's request intent; this different classification would fit when a logged-in user's browser submits a state-changing request after visiting an unrelated malicious page, not the evidence pointing to exposed session cookie in the question.

Question 93

To confirm effective security handling of mobile permission minimization, which result should an analyst prioritize?

  1. Managed-device telemetry flags or prevents apps not signed and delivered by approved publishers.
  2. The app refuses test servers with untrusted or mismatched certificates during connection setup.
  3. Permission audits confirm the app functions without access to contacts, microphone, or location.
  4. A simulated lost-device workflow revokes enterprise sessions and removes managed corporate content.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Mobile platform permissions restrict sensitive APIs, but users and administrators still must assess necessity; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that a flashlight app asks for microphone, contact, and precise-location access without a relevant feature.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Unreviewed side-loading increases exposure to modified packages and misleading publisher identities; that evidence is relevant when employees install a business lookalike app from an unknown APK source outside the approved enterprise catalog, but does not establish closure of the mobile permission minimization exposure.

B:

Disabling TLS certificate validation enables impersonation even when the connection uses encryption; that evidence is relevant when an application accepts any server certificate while connecting to its financial API, but does not establish closure of the mobile permission minimization exposure.

D:

Loss of a mobile device exposes cached content without encryption, access controls, and recovery capability; that evidence is relevant when a staff phone containing corporate correspondence is lost while unlocked and unenrolled in management, but does not establish closure of the mobile permission minimization exposure.

Question 94

The owner says separation of duties has been addressed. Which recorded outcome should the independent tester seek?

  1. Workflow logs show the requester and approver are different authorized identities.
  2. A permission test shows the reporting identity can view dashboards but cannot change policy or user roles.
  3. The approved rules specify test windows, out-of-scope actions, emergency contacts, and stop triggers.
  4. Signed baselines and change records explain every detected alteration to the configuration.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Splitting incompatible responsibilities prevents one individual from completing a sensitive process without review; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that one employee can request a high-risk production change and approve the same request.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Excess privileges enlarge the consequence of identity compromise beyond legitimate job requirements; that evidence is relevant when a reporting account can edit security policies despite requiring only read access to dashboards, but does not establish closure of the separation of duties exposure.

C:

Engagement rules translate authorization into actionable limits on methods, time windows, escalation, and contacts; that evidence is relevant when the client permits enumeration during business hours but prohibits disruptive tests against production, but does not establish closure of the separation of duties exposure.

D:

Integrity addresses unauthorized or accidental modification of data, code, or settings; that evidence is relevant when a configuration file changes unexpectedly while the server remains reachable and no secret is disclosed, but does not establish closure of the separation of duties exposure.

Question 95

Which mechanism should a defender associate with honeypot deception telemetry?

  1. Address translation changes packet addressing and does not itself replace explicit security policy enforcement.
  2. An inline IPS can actively drop or reject packets based on policy and detections.
  3. A honeypot acts as a controlled decoy and generates high-signal alerts when unexpected interaction occurs.
  4. Outbound policy and DNS controls constrain unauthorized communication from internal systems.
  5. Host-based detection uses operating-system events and file state to reveal activities inside endpoints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

An isolated system with no business users receives unauthorized login attempts from an unknown source; that situation illustrates the actual operating behavior under review. Its practical safeguard is to isolate decoy services and collect their telemetry without allowing lateral movement into production, with confirmation when decoy access is logged and containment tests show the honeypot cannot reach production trust zones.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An external address maps to a private application host, but reviewers assume NAT automatically performs authorization; those details characterize NAT policy confusion and would call for apply access-control rules separately from translation mappings and verify their order of evaluation, rather than explaining honeypot deception telemetry.

B:

A malicious signature test is blocked before packets reach the protected application endpoint; those details characterize inline IPS enforcement and would call for deploy preventive inspection in the intended forwarding path and test safe exception handling, rather than explaining honeypot deception telemetry.

D:

A compromised host reaches an unusual external endpoint because the perimeter controls only inbound traffic; those details characterize firewall egress restriction and would call for limit permitted egress destinations and monitor unusual outbound application traffic, rather than explaining honeypot deception telemetry.

E:

A server alert reports unauthorized changes to local system files that were not visible on the network sensor; those details characterize host intrusion detection and would call for deploy protected endpoint telemetry and monitor high-value files and local privileges, rather than explaining honeypot deception telemetry.

Question 96

For a security control relating to radio interference diagnosis, which result shows meaningful enforcement rather than intent alone?

  1. Wireless accounting records tie each accepted connection to an authorized user or device identity.
  2. Wireless surveys show lower contention and improved retries after the approved channel plan.
  3. Survey measurements confirm fewer overlapping transmissions and stable client coverage.
  4. Managed clients reject lookalike access points whose authentication-server identity is not trusted.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Shared airtime and channel interference degrade performance even when wireless authentication is correct; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that wireless clients show high retry counts on channels heavily used by neighboring access points.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enterprise WLAN access uses 802.1X and an authentication backend to manage per-identity access; that evidence is relevant when a corporate wireless network needs distinct user or device identities instead of one shared password, but does not establish closure of the radio interference diagnosis exposure.

C:

The 2.4 GHz band has limited nonoverlapping channel choices and is often heavily congested; that evidence is relevant when an access point on 2.4 GHz uses overlapping channels and competes with nearby legacy devices, but does not establish closure of the radio interference diagnosis exposure.

D:

An evil-twin AP impersonates a trusted network name to attract client associations or credentials; that evidence is relevant when a laptop connects to a nearby access point using the company SSID but an unfamiliar certificate and controller, but does not establish closure of the radio interference diagnosis exposure.

Question 97

Which statement is most consistent with the actual behavior of encrypted traffic visibility?

  1. Transport encryption limits inspection of application content unless decryption is explicitly authorized and configured.
  2. UDP lacks a connection handshake; silence alone does not prove whether an application is listening.
  3. A reset typically signals a rejected or nonexistent TCP connection, which differs from silent filtering.
  4. Passive fingerprinting observes packet properties and protocol behaviors already traversing the sensor.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A network monitor can see TLS endpoints and timing but not protected application payloads; that situation illustrates the actual operating behavior under review. Its practical safeguard is to correlate endpoint and metadata telemetry instead of assuming packet capture reveals encrypted requests, with confirmation when a review confirms the sensor records connection metadata while protected payload content stays opaque.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A UDP service probe returns no payload and no reachable error indication; those details characterize UDP response ambiguity and would call for use protocol-specific safe requests plus host and firewall telemetry where authorized, rather than explaining encrypted traffic visibility.

C:

A probe receives an immediate RST from a reachable address rather than a service welcome banner; those details characterize TCP reset interpretation and would call for correlate reset traffic with service listeners and firewall policy before concluding a port is open, rather than explaining encrypted traffic visibility.

D:

A network sensor infers endpoint platform traits from ordinary traffic without sending probes; those details characterize passive os fingerprinting and would call for use mirrored authorized traffic and avoid treating passive fingerprints as definitive identity proof, rather than explaining encrypted traffic visibility.

Question 98

The scope-approved analysis reports: A cross-site navigation unexpectedly includes a privileged session cookie in a request to an internal application. Which issue or method is primarily illustrated?

  1. Session logout invalidation
  2. Cross-site request forgery
  3. Exposed session cookie
  4. Sensitive cookie SameSite policy

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

SameSite controls when browsers attach cookies to cross-site requests, reducing some ambient-authentication abuse; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to choose an appropriate SameSite policy and independently protect state-changing requests against CSRF, verified when browser tests confirm cross-site request contexts do not send privileged cookies where prohibited.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Client-side cookie deletion alone may not revoke server-recognized sessions or long-lived tokens; this different classification would fit when a user clicks logout, but a copied access token continues authorizing API requests until its original expiry, not the evidence pointing to sensitive cookie samesite policy in the question.

B:

CSRF abuses ambient browser credentials when the application fails to verify the user's request intent; this different classification would fit when a logged-in user's browser submits a state-changing request after visiting an unrelated malicious page, not the evidence pointing to sensitive cookie samesite policy in the question.

C:

An accessible session token can be replayed to impersonate an authenticated browser session if stolen; this different classification would fit when a browser extension can read an authentication cookie because the cookie lacks appropriate client-side protections, not the evidence pointing to sensitive cookie samesite policy in the question.

Question 99

The blue team wants an accurate model of captive portal limitations. Which statement should it retain?

  1. An evil-twin AP impersonates a trusted network name to attract client associations or credentials.
  2. Bluetooth pairing establishes device trust that should be validated to avoid unintended connections.
  3. Enterprise WLAN access uses 802.1X and an authentication backend to manage per-identity access.
  4. EAP-TLS uses certificate-based mutual authentication when client and server trust are properly validated.
  5. Captive portals provide access workflow, not end-to-end confidentiality or strong device authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

E:

An airport network displays a terms page, and users assume the portal itself encrypts all subsequent traffic; that situation illustrates the actual operating behavior under review. Its practical safeguard is to use HTTPS and trusted VPN or application encryption independently of portal acceptance, with confirmation when application connections negotiate authenticated encryption after captive-portal completion.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A laptop connects to a nearby access point using the company SSID but an unfamiliar certificate and controller; those details characterize evil twin access point and would call for require validated enterprise server certificates and restrict automatic connections to untrusted profiles, rather than explaining captive portal limitations.

B:

A mobile accessory repeatedly requests pairing while advertising an unexpected device identity; those details characterize Bluetooth pairing trust and would call for use secure pairing modes and verify device identities before authorizing trust relationships, rather than explaining captive portal limitations.

C:

A corporate wireless network needs distinct user or device identities instead of one shared password; those details characterize WPA2-enterprise authentication and would call for use 802.1X with centrally managed identity policy and protected client authentication, rather than explaining captive portal limitations.

D:

Managed laptops must authenticate to enterprise Wi-Fi without sending reusable user passwords; those details characterize EAP-TLS identity assurance and would call for deploy managed client certificates and require trusted authentication-server certificate validation, rather than explaining captive portal limitations.

Question 100

Under an authorized engagement, the report states: A mobile app stores persistent authentication tokens as plaintext in a world-readable debug file. Which protective practice belongs in the fix plan?

  1. Deny unrelated permissions and distribute apps through a reviewed enterprise catalog.
  2. Store secrets in platform-protected key storage and avoid persistent sensitive debug output.
  3. Apply mobile application management and restrict unapproved package installation on managed devices.
  4. Use a managed work profile or equivalent app-container policy for corporate information.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Locally stored credentials are exposed if applications use unsafe storage locations or logging behavior; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that static and runtime checks show no reusable tokens in plain app logs or shared files.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Mobile platform permissions restrict sensitive APIs, but users and administrators still must assess necessity; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a flashlight app asks for microphone, contact, and precise-location access without a relevant feature, rather than the insecure mobile storage finding described here.

C:

Unreviewed side-loading increases exposure to modified packages and misleading publisher identities; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where employees install a business lookalike app from an unknown APK source outside the approved enterprise catalog, rather than the insecure mobile storage finding described here.

D:

Managed work containers separate enterprise data and policies from personal applications where supported; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where an employer wants to remove corporate email from a personally owned phone without erasing family photos, rather than the insecure mobile storage finding described here.

Certified Ethical Hacker v13 (312-50v13) Practice Tests