ECCouncil 312-50v13 (Certified Ethical Hacker v13) Practice Test 22

Question 210

Security operations must sign off on password salt uniqueness. Which evidence would most directly support acceptance?

  1. Database samples show different salts and derived hashes for equal controlled test passwords.
  2. Recomputed digests match documented originals and differ when controlled content changes.
  3. Only the designated private-key holder can recover the protected secret in a controlled test.
  4. Encryption telemetry and tests show no repeated key-nonce pairs across protected messages.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A unique random salt makes identical passwords yield different password-hash outputs under the same KDF; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that two users have identical passwords but their stored password hashes must not reveal that equality directly.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A cryptographic hash creates a fixed-length digest useful for checking content integrity, not encrypting content; that evidence is relevant when a forensic copy must be compared with its original to detect byte-level changes, but does not establish closure of the password salt uniqueness exposure.

C:

Public-key cryptography can use a recipient's public key to establish confidentiality while the private key stays secret; that evidence is relevant when a sender needs to protect a short secret for a recipient without first sharing a symmetric key, but does not establish closure of the password salt uniqueness exposure.

D:

AES-GCM security depends on avoiding nonce reuse under a given key because reuse undermines confidentiality and authenticity; that evidence is relevant when an encryption system repeatedly uses the same nonce and key for different AES-GCM messages, but does not establish closure of the password salt uniqueness exposure.

Question 211

The owner says persistence via autoruns has been addressed. Which recorded outcome should the independent tester seek?

  1. Endpoint telemetry flags the unapproved parent-child chain even though the utility itself is signed.
  2. Test variants produce alerts on suspicious activity even when the original static file hash differs.
  3. Startup comparisons show only approved persistence entries after remediation and reboot.
  4. Sandbox reports capture observed behavior without connections into protected production systems.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Autorun entries can preserve malicious startup behavior without relying on the original launch process; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that an unapproved program restarts after each user login because a startup registration remains present.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Living-off-the-land activity can misuse legitimate signed tools, making signature trust alone insufficient; that evidence is relevant when a trusted operating-system utility unexpectedly launches a suspicious script from a user-writable location, but does not establish closure of the persistence via autoruns exposure.

B:

Static indicators are brittle when malware is repackaged; behaviors can generalize across variants; that evidence is relevant when a threat hunt misses a changed malicious binary because the alert relies exclusively on one file hash, but does not establish closure of the persistence via autoruns exposure.

D:

An isolated analysis environment records process, file, registry, and network behavior with containment; that evidence is relevant when a defender needs to observe a suspicious file's effects without running it on a production workstation, but does not establish closure of the persistence via autoruns exposure.

Question 212

An authorized security review records the following: An isolated system with no business users receives unauthorized login attempts from an unknown source. Which concept most accurately classifies the observation?

  1. Honeypot deception telemetry
  2. Firewall egress restriction
  3. Anomaly baseline drift
  4. Network IDS visibility

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A honeypot acts as a controlled decoy and generates high-signal alerts when unexpected interaction occurs; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to isolate decoy services and collect their telemetry without allowing lateral movement into production, verified when decoy access is logged and containment tests show the honeypot cannot reach production trust zones.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Outbound policy and DNS controls constrain unauthorized communication from internal systems; this different classification would fit when a compromised host reaches an unusual external endpoint because the perimeter controls only inbound traffic, not the evidence pointing to honeypot deception telemetry in the question.

C:

Anomaly systems depend on normal-behavior models that can drift after genuine environment changes; this different classification would fit when a detection tool generates many false alarms after a legitimate scheduled workload changes traffic patterns, not the evidence pointing to honeypot deception telemetry in the question.

D:

An IDS detects or reports activity while remaining outside the active traffic-blocking decision path; this different classification would fit when a passive network sensor raises an alert about suspicious packets but does not terminate the connection, not the evidence pointing to honeypot deception telemetry in the question.

Question 213

A review board requests objective closure evidence for stateful firewall tracking. Which outcome should be supplied?

  1. Approved IPv4 and IPv6 checks demonstrate consistent service exposure boundaries.
  2. A service inventory and capture show whether the endpoint deliberately rejects that destination port.
  3. Application logs and packet captures corroborate whether a UDP request reached a listening service.
  4. Firewall decisions and permitted-path tests explain why the remote probe cannot establish a state.
  5. Packet traces show valid handshake completion and matching return traffic for authorized connections.
  6. Connection-state records associate allowed return packets with their permitted initiating sessions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

F:

Stateful filtering remembers connection context so established responses can be handled differently from new flows; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that a firewall permits return traffic for a permitted outbound connection without a broad inbound rule.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IPv4 and IPv6 have separate addresses and filtering paths; protecting one family does not secure the other; that evidence is relevant when an endpoint firewall protects IPv4 traffic but an unintended service is reachable over IPv6, but does not establish closure of the stateful firewall tracking exposure.

B:

A reset typically signals a rejected or nonexistent TCP connection, which differs from silent filtering; that evidence is relevant when a probe receives an immediate RST from a reachable address rather than a service welcome banner, but does not establish closure of the stateful firewall tracking exposure.

C:

UDP lacks a connection handshake; silence alone does not prove whether an application is listening; that evidence is relevant when a UDP service probe returns no payload and no reachable error indication, but does not establish closure of the stateful firewall tracking exposure.

D:

Filtering or packet loss can prevent a conclusive TCP port-state observation from a remote position; that evidence is relevant when a probe to a specific port receives no response while other ports on the same host reply, but does not establish closure of the stateful firewall tracking exposure.

E:

TCP establishes state through a handshake before transferring reliable bidirectional application data; that evidence is relevant when a connection trace shows SYN, SYN-ACK, and ACK before application data flows, but does not establish closure of the stateful firewall tracking exposure.

Question 214

For the topic of WAF request inspection, which operational explanation is accurate?

  1. Host-based detection uses operating-system events and file state to reveal activities inside endpoints.
  2. An IDS detects or reports activity while remaining outside the active traffic-blocking decision path.
  3. Without authorized decryption or endpoint visibility, encrypted application content is opaque to passive perimeter inspection.
  4. An inline IPS can actively drop or reject packets based on policy and detections.
  5. Outbound policy and DNS controls constrain unauthorized communication from internal systems.
  6. A WAF evaluates application-layer HTTP behavior and rules rather than merely transport ports.

Explanation

Correct Answer

F:

A web attack request is rejected at the HTTP edge while a network firewall still permits TCP port 443; that situation illustrates the actual operating behavior under review. Its practical safeguard is to apply and tune managed application rules alongside server-side input validation, with confirmation when WAF logs record the malicious request decision while normal authenticated transactions succeed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A server alert reports unauthorized changes to local system files that were not visible on the network sensor; those details characterize host intrusion detection and would call for deploy protected endpoint telemetry and monitor high-value files and local privileges, rather than explaining WAF request inspection.

B:

A passive network sensor raises an alert about suspicious packets but does not terminate the connection; those details characterize network IDS visibility and would call for send IDS alerts to response workflows and place preventive enforcement where needed, rather than explaining WAF request inspection.

C:

A perimeter appliance detects destination addresses but cannot see threats hidden inside end-to-end encrypted payloads; those details characterize encrypted channel inspection limitation and would call for use endpoint detection and approved TLS inspection designs where legally and operationally appropriate, rather than explaining WAF request inspection.

D:

A malicious signature test is blocked before packets reach the protected application endpoint; those details characterize inline IPS enforcement and would call for deploy preventive inspection in the intended forwarding path and test safe exception handling, rather than explaining WAF request inspection.

E:

A compromised host reaches an unusual external endpoint because the perimeter controls only inbound traffic; those details characterize firewall egress restriction and would call for limit permitted egress destinations and monitor unusual outbound application traffic, rather than explaining WAF request inspection.

Question 215

A verified investigation detail states: A caller sounds like the finance director and orders an urgent transfer, but the account details fail normal verification. Which named security principle or technique applies?

  1. SMS phishing
  2. Synthetic-voice impersonation
  3. Tailgating access
  4. Voice phishing

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

AI-generated voice imitation can mimic a trusted person's speech without proving caller identity or authority; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to require independent callback and dual authorization for payments regardless of apparent voice identity, verified when transaction logs show the payment was held until callback validation and independent approval completed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Smishing delivers fraudulent instructions through text messages rather than email or phone calls; this different classification would fit when a text message uses a package-delivery pretext to send a user to an unfamiliar sign-in site, not the evidence pointing to synthetic-voice impersonation in the question.

C:

Tailgating exploits courtesy or distraction to cross physical security boundaries without individual authorization; this different classification would fit when an unbadged visitor follows a legitimate employee through a controlled door without presenting credentials, not the evidence pointing to synthetic-voice impersonation in the question.

D:

Vishing exploits voice conversations to elicit secrets or persuade users to take unsafe actions; this different classification would fit when a caller posing as technical support asks an employee to read a one-time login code aloud, not the evidence pointing to synthetic-voice impersonation in the question.

Question 216

The blue team wants an accurate model of symmetric confidentiality. Which statement should it retain?

  1. Public-key cryptography can use a recipient's public key to establish confidentiality while the private key stays secret.
  2. Envelope encryption encrypts bulk content with data keys and wraps those keys under a separate managed key.
  3. Symmetric algorithms use a shared secret for encryption and decryption and are efficient for bulk data.
  4. AES-GCM security depends on avoiding nonce reuse under a given key because reuse undermines confidentiality and authenticity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A large backup needs efficient encryption and decryption with the same protected secret key; that situation illustrates the actual operating behavior under review. Its practical safeguard is to use authenticated symmetric encryption and manage key access separately from stored ciphertext, with confirmation when recovery tests decrypt backups only with authorized key access and detect modified ciphertext.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A sender needs to protect a short secret for a recipient without first sharing a symmetric key; those details characterize asymmetric key roles and would call for validate recipient public keys and protect the associated private key from unauthorized use, rather than explaining symmetric confidentiality.

B:

A storage platform encrypts each object with a short-lived data key protected by a central master key; those details characterize envelope encryption and would call for use per-object or per-context data keys and limit master-key unwrap permissions, rather than explaining symmetric confidentiality.

D:

An encryption system repeatedly uses the same nonce and key for different AES-GCM messages; those details characterize AES-GCM nonce management and would call for generate unique nonces for each encryption operation under the same key, rather than explaining symmetric confidentiality.

Question 217

An analyst is explaining certificate chain trust to a system owner. Which description is technically correct?

  1. Certificate validation relies on a chain of appropriate signatures, trust anchors, usage constraints, and identity matching.
  2. Ephemeral key agreement can give forward secrecy by deriving session secrets independent of a recoverable long-term key.
  3. A unique random salt makes identical passwords yield different password-hash outputs under the same KDF.
  4. Revocation lets relying parties learn that an otherwise unexpired certificate should no longer be trusted.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

An HTTPS endpoint presents a leaf certificate but no valid path to a trusted certificate authority; that situation illustrates the actual operating behavior under review. Its practical safeguard is to install the correct intermediate certificates and require full client trust validation, with confirmation when independent clients build a valid chain to an accepted trust anchor without bypass warnings.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A captured encrypted session should remain protected even if the server's long-term private key is exposed later; those details characterize TLS forward secrecy and would call for enable modern TLS suites with ephemeral key exchange and protect endpoint certificates, rather than explaining certificate chain trust.

C:

Two users have identical passwords but their stored password hashes must not reveal that equality directly; those details characterize password salt uniqueness and would call for generate independent salts per password and store them alongside slow password hashes, rather than explaining certificate chain trust.

D:

A certificate's private key is compromised well before its scheduled expiration date; those details characterize certificate revocation status and would call for revoke the affected certificate, replace keys, and configure appropriate status distribution, rather than explaining certificate chain trust.

Question 218

What verification result would best support closure of a finding about public code repository search?

  1. Search results no longer surface the sensitive content after source and cache remediation.
  2. The approved prefix list maps each network range to a verified owner or explicit third-party exclusion.
  3. Credential verification shows the leaked token is invalid and repository scanning detects future test leaks.
  4. The partner's revised public pages no longer expose internal service names or customer-only references.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Repository history and forks can preserve accidentally committed secrets beyond the current branch; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that a company name appears in a public repository containing a committed configuration file with an API token.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Indexing and caching can preserve publicly exposed content after the origin page changes; that evidence is relevant when a deleted internal page remains discoverable through a third-party search index snippet, but does not establish closure of the public code repository search exposure.

B:

Autonomous system registration and routing information connect public prefixes with network operators; that evidence is relevant when a network researcher needs to distinguish an organization's routed address prefixes from a vendor's hosting range, but does not establish closure of the public code repository search exposure.

D:

Supply-chain footprints include information published by service providers outside the main organization's domain; that evidence is relevant when a public partner portal lists customer organization names and private service references, but does not establish closure of the public code repository search exposure.

Question 219

For the topic of asymmetric key roles, which operational explanation is accurate?

  1. AES-GCM security depends on avoiding nonce reuse under a given key because reuse undermines confidentiality and authenticity.
  2. Symmetric algorithms use a shared secret for encryption and decryption and are efficient for bulk data.
  3. An HMAC combines a secret key with a cryptographic hash to authenticate message integrity.
  4. Public-key cryptography can use a recipient's public key to establish confidentiality while the private key stays secret.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A sender needs to protect a short secret for a recipient without first sharing a symmetric key; that situation illustrates the actual operating behavior under review. Its practical safeguard is to validate recipient public keys and protect the associated private key from unauthorized use, with confirmation when only the designated private-key holder can recover the protected secret in a controlled test.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An encryption system repeatedly uses the same nonce and key for different AES-GCM messages; those details characterize AES-GCM nonce management and would call for generate unique nonces for each encryption operation under the same key, rather than explaining asymmetric key roles.

B:

A large backup needs efficient encryption and decryption with the same protected secret key; those details characterize symmetric confidentiality and would call for use authenticated symmetric encryption and manage key access separately from stored ciphertext, rather than explaining asymmetric key roles.

C:

Two trusted systems share a secret and need to detect tampering in exchanged messages; those details characterize HMAC authentication and would call for protect HMAC keys and use a suitable modern hash with key separation, rather than explaining asymmetric key roles.

Question 220

The team is closing an assessment finding: An attacker instructs a user to approve an unsolicited authenticator prompt as part of a supposed help-desk repair. What measure is most appropriate to implement?

  1. Prohibit sharing verification codes and require callbacks to published support numbers.
  2. Enforce dual approval and independently verify high-value instructions regardless of apparent sender rank.
  3. Use phishing-resistant authentication and instruct staff to reject prompts they did not initiate.
  4. Enforce one-person-per-credential access and provide safe visitor challenge procedures.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Social pressure can convert an MFA approval into user-assisted account takeover despite a separate factor; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that test events show unsolicited approval requests are rejected and reported through the security channel.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Vishing exploits voice conversations to elicit secrets or persuade users to take unsafe actions; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a caller posing as technical support asks an employee to read a one-time login code aloud, rather than the MFA approval deception finding described here.

B:

Whaling targets senior leaders or uses their authority to manipulate high-value business decisions; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a message impersonates a senior officer and directs the finance team to bypass a payment approval step, rather than the MFA approval deception finding described here.

D:

Tailgating exploits courtesy or distraction to cross physical security boundaries without individual authorization; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where an unbadged visitor follows a legitimate employee through a controlled door without presenting credentials, rather than the MFA approval deception finding described here.

Certified Ethical Hacker v13 (312-50v13) Practice Tests