ECCouncil 312-50v13 (Certified Ethical Hacker v13) Practice Test 93

Question 920

The security owner reviews this situation: Multiple smart sensors share an unchanged default administrative password across an entire facility. What is the most suitable targeted safeguard?

  1. Remove default access paths and restrict management UI reachability to authorized maintenance stations.
  2. Inventory firmware versions and establish supported staged updates with rollback planning.
  3. Require cryptographically verified updates and a secure boot chain where supported.
  4. Use unique per-device credentials or managed identities and disable unused default accounts.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Factory credentials create predictable management access if they remain active after device commissioning; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that inventory tests show factory logins rejected and approved maintenance identities individually tracked.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Embedded management interfaces may retain obsolete defaults and limited authentication controls for years; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a connected controller exposes a vendor maintenance page with unchanged factory settings over the plant network, rather than the IoT factory credentials finding described here.

B:

Unmanaged update processes leave persistent known weaknesses in long-lived embedded deployments; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where deployed devices receive security fixes inconsistently because no operator owns their update policy, rather than the IoT factory credentials finding described here.

C:

Unsigned update paths permit modified firmware to be accepted as if it were trusted vendor software; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a gateway installs downloaded firmware without checking that it came from an approved signer, rather than the IoT factory credentials finding described here.

Question 921

A client requests practical treatment for this condition: A software publisher wants recipients to verify who signed an update and whether its contents changed. Which measure is the closest match?

  1. Protect HMAC keys and use a suitable modern hash with key separation.
  2. Enable modern TLS suites with ephemeral key exchange and protect endpoint certificates.
  3. Sign releases through protected keys and verify signatures before applying updates.
  4. Sign messages with managed identities and encrypt them separately when privacy is required.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Signatures use a private signing key and are verified with the corresponding trusted public key; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that a modified update fails signature verification while the genuine signed artifact passes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An HMAC combines a secret key with a cryptographic hash to authenticate message integrity; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where two trusted systems share a secret and need to detect tampering in exchanged messages, rather than the digital signature authenticity finding described here.

B:

Ephemeral key agreement can give forward secrecy by deriving session secrets independent of a recoverable long-term key; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a captured encrypted session should remain protected even if the server's long-term private key is exposed later, rather than the digital signature authenticity finding described here.

D:

Email signatures provide authenticity and integrity; confidentiality requires separate encryption of content; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a recipient must verify a message's sender integrity while recognizing that signatures do not inherently hide message text, rather than the digital signature authenticity finding described here.

Question 922

A single approved remediation review covers 2 separately named requirements: (1) Inline IPS enforcement; (2) WAF request inspection. Which audit outcomes would directly demonstrate protection for those areas? Choose TWO.

  1. Network evidence shows alerts generated without the sensor independently blocking test traffic.
  2. Local and centralized event records show the unauthorized change with host identity and timestamp.
  3. Inline device logs record blocked test flows while allowed business sessions continue.
  4. Safe test variations trigger behavior rules even when their exact byte sequences differ.
  5. WAF logs record the malicious request decision while normal authenticated transactions succeed.

Explanation

Correct Answers

C:

This verifies the inline IPS enforcement component alongside inline IPS enforcement in the combined audit: an inline IPS can actively drop or reject packets based on policy and detections. For the inline IPS enforcement audit set, the relevant observed case is that a malicious signature test is blocked before packets reach the protected application endpoint.

E:

This verifies the WAF request inspection component alongside inline IPS enforcement in the combined audit: a WAF evaluates application-layer HTTP behavior and rules rather than merely transport ports. For the inline IPS enforcement audit set, the relevant observed case is that a web attack request is rejected at the HTTP edge while a network firewall still permits TCP port 443.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An IDS detects or reports activity while remaining outside the active traffic-blocking decision path; this result is evidence about network IDS visibility when a passive network sensor raises an alert about suspicious packets but does not terminate the connection, not a direct closure test for the named inline IPS enforcement, WAF request inspection requirements.

B:

Host-based detection uses operating-system events and file state to reveal activities inside endpoints; this result is evidence about host intrusion detection when a server alert reports unauthorized changes to local system files that were not visible on the network sensor, not a direct closure test for the named inline IPS enforcement, WAF request inspection requirements.

D:

Signatures precisely match known patterns but may miss novel, obfuscated, or modified activity; this result is evidence about signature-only detection gap when a previously unseen behavior evades a rule set that only recognizes known byte patterns, not a direct closure test for the named inline IPS enforcement, WAF request inspection requirements.

Question 923

For the documented case, consider: A malicious signature test is blocked before packets reach the protected application endpoint. Which specific defensive response is indicated?

  1. Apply and tune managed application rules alongside server-side input validation.
  2. Send IDS alerts to response workflows and place preventive enforcement where needed.
  3. Deploy preventive inspection in the intended forwarding path and test safe exception handling.
  4. Apply access-control rules separately from translation mappings and verify their order of evaluation.
  5. Use endpoint detection and approved TLS inspection designs where legally and operationally appropriate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

An inline IPS can actively drop or reject packets based on policy and detections; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that inline device logs record blocked test flows while allowed business sessions continue.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A WAF evaluates application-layer HTTP behavior and rules rather than merely transport ports; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a web attack request is rejected at the HTTP edge while a network firewall still permits TCP port 443, rather than the inline IPS enforcement finding described here.

B:

An IDS detects or reports activity while remaining outside the active traffic-blocking decision path; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a passive network sensor raises an alert about suspicious packets but does not terminate the connection, rather than the inline IPS enforcement finding described here.

D:

Address translation changes packet addressing and does not itself replace explicit security policy enforcement; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where an external address maps to a private application host, but reviewers assume NAT automatically performs authorization, rather than the inline IPS enforcement finding described here.

E:

Without authorized decryption or endpoint visibility, encrypted application content is opaque to passive perimeter inspection; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a perimeter appliance detects destination addresses but cannot see threats hidden inside end-to-end encrypted payloads, rather than the inline IPS enforcement finding described here.

Question 924

A planned improvement must address the following: A path trace lists intermediate routers based on responses to packets with limited hop counts. Which control best targets that requirement?

  1. Use route telemetry and approved traces together when analyzing an incomplete hop list.
  2. Apply inter-zone deny policies and permit only documented management flows.
  3. Interpret ICMP code and network path together instead of assuming every error means a dead host.
  4. Confirm liveness through an authorized service check rather than treating missing echo replies as proof of absence.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

TTL or hop-limit expiry can elicit intermediate-router diagnostics without revealing every hidden segment; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that recorded network paths reconcile missing trace responses with routers configured not to send diagnostics.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A segmentation failure occurs when network paths bypass the intended trust-zone boundary; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a workstation in a guest VLAN reaches a management interface that should be isolated, rather than the traceroute hop inference finding described here.

C:

ICMP errors signal forwarding or delivery conditions and may be filtered or rate-limited in practice; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a router returns a destination-unreachable diagnostic for a packet that cannot be forwarded, rather than the traceroute hop inference finding described here.

D:

Echo-response filtering can hide ping responses without proving that the host or its services are offline; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a monitored host does not answer ping but its approved application endpoint still accepts connections, rather than the traceroute hop inference finding described here.

Question 925

A validation plan targets asset coverage baseline. What result would demonstrate the specified protective boundary?

  1. The coverage report identifies every inventoried system as scanned, exempted, or awaiting assessment.
  2. The finalized ticket cites validated software evidence, exposure, and business impact rather than the model estimate.
  3. Registry scan results for the deployed digest show remediated packages and traceable image provenance.
  4. The prioritized ticket explains organizational exposure separately from the underlying CVSS score.
  5. A subsequent compliance check verifies the legacy protocol is disabled on every affected host.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Scan coverage is meaningful only when tested assets are reconciled against authoritative inventory and scope; the outcome tests this precise property in the production control. It relates to the original observation that a weekly scanner report lists 300 targets while the active inventory contains 420 managed systems.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Probabilistic AI summaries can assist prioritization but do not replace authenticated evidence or analyst validation; that evidence is relevant when an automated AI triage report labels a service vulnerable despite missing package evidence and system-owner context, but does not establish closure of the asset coverage baseline exposure.

C:

Container images carry dependency and OS-package vulnerabilities into deployed workloads; that evidence is relevant when a deployment inherits outdated operating-system packages from an unmaintained base container image, but does not establish closure of the asset coverage baseline exposure.

D:

CVSS communicates technical severity characteristics and is not, by itself, a full organization-specific risk score; that evidence is relevant when a vulnerability report uses a standardized severity number without considering whether the vulnerable system is exposed, but does not establish closure of the asset coverage baseline exposure.

E:

Configuration drift exposes services even when software is fully patched and scanner signatures are clean; that evidence is relevant when a server's approved security baseline disables a legacy protocol, but a local setting re-enables it, but does not establish closure of the asset coverage baseline exposure.

Question 926

The remediation board receives this evidence: An application reconstructs complex server objects directly from untrusted client-supplied serialized data. Which action most directly improves the control?

  1. Enforce per-object access policy for every data retrieval and modification request.
  2. Allowlist intended destinations and block internal or metadata network targets in the fetching service.
  3. Allowlist writable fields for each endpoint and enforce ownership and role restrictions.
  4. Avoid native object deserialization from clients and use validated simple data contracts.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Deserialization of untrusted object graphs can trigger unsafe code paths or unexpected property changes; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that malformed serialized input is rejected before dangerous object constructors or methods are invoked.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Object-level authorization fails when the server trusts a client-chosen identifier without checking ownership; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a signed-in customer changes a record identifier and sees another customer's invoice, rather than the unsafe object deserialization finding described here.

B:

SSRF abuses a server's network privileges to request destinations inaccessible to the external client; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a document-preview service fetches an arbitrary URL supplied by a user and reaches internal-only resources, rather than the unsafe object deserialization finding described here.

C:

Mass assignment arises when untrusted request fields bind directly to sensitive model properties; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a profile update API accepts an undocumented isAdmin property and writes it to the user record, rather than the unsafe object deserialization finding described here.

Question 927

The security team observes this condition: A document asks recipients to enable active content to view a supposedly routine invoice. Which term should appear in the primary finding?

  1. Self-propagating worm
  2. File-infecting virus
  3. Malicious macro attachment
  4. Trojan masquerade

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Macro-enabled documents can execute code when users permit active scripting in untrusted files; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to disable untrusted document macros and isolate high-risk attachments from routine workflows, verified when a controlled test attachment cannot execute macros under the applied document policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Worms can spread automatically through vulnerable network paths without needing a human to launch each copy; this different classification would fit when infected hosts begin transmitting infection attempts to neighboring machines without user-opened attachments, not the evidence pointing to malicious macro attachment in the question.

B:

Viruses reproduce by infecting host files and normally rely on execution to spread infection; this different classification would fit when a malicious program inserts its code into other executable files that later run on the same host, not the evidence pointing to malicious macro attachment in the question.

D:

A Trojan relies on deceptive packaging or consent rather than autonomous worm-like replication; this different classification would fit when an executable marketed as a routine system utility installs an unrelated unwanted component when launched, not the evidence pointing to malicious macro attachment in the question.

Question 928

An analyst is sorting findings by mechanism. One entry reads: One employee can request a high-risk production change and approve the same request. Which label is the right one?

  1. Least privilege
  2. Risk-based prioritization
  3. Separation of duties
  4. Integrity protection

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Splitting incompatible responsibilities prevents one individual from completing a sensitive process without review; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to require independent approval for privileged production changes and prohibit self-approval, verified when workflow logs show the requester and approver are different authorized identities.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Excess privileges enlarge the consequence of identity compromise beyond legitimate job requirements; this different classification would fit when a reporting account can edit security policies despite requiring only read access to dashboards, not the evidence pointing to separation of duties in the question.

B:

Operational risk also depends on exposure, business impact, asset importance, and exploitability, not severity alone; this different classification would fit when two findings have equal technical severity, but only one affects an internet-facing payroll system, not the evidence pointing to separation of duties in the question.

D:

Integrity addresses unauthorized or accidental modification of data, code, or settings; this different classification would fit when a configuration file changes unexpectedly while the server remains reachable and no secret is disclosed, not the evidence pointing to separation of duties in the question.

Question 929

A client requests practical treatment for this condition: A malicious third-party page embeds the protected site in an invisible frame to manipulate user clicks. Which measure is the closest match?

  1. Disable unintended autoindex behavior and grant file access only where explicitly required.
  2. Deploy HTTPS consistently and send a correctly scoped Strict-Transport-Security header.
  3. Use a suitable Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors directive for the protected site.
  4. Deploy a certificate covering the correct service name and validate its chain and renewal.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Frame-embedding restrictions can reduce clickjacking exposure by limiting allowed ancestor origins; this is the specific exposure or dependency that the selected action addresses. After treatment, the assessor should confirm that cross-origin framing tests fail for untrusted sites and pass only for approved embedding contexts.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Directory browsing is a server feature that can publish file names and paths when index content is absent; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a browser can enumerate filenames in a public directory even though no index page was intended, rather than the security header framing control finding described here.

B:

HSTS directs compliant browsers to use HTTPS for the host after receiving a valid secure policy; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where a site supports HTTPS but returning visitors sometimes attempt insecure HTTP connections first, rather than the security header framing control finding described here.

D:

TLS identity assurance depends on valid trust chains and matching names, not encryption alone; the proposed safeguard addresses a case where browsers warn that the server certificate is issued for a different hostname than the requested site, rather than the security header framing control finding described here.

Question 930

The scope-approved analysis reports: Infected hosts begin transmitting infection attempts to neighboring machines without user-opened attachments. Which issue or method is primarily illustrated?

  1. Endpoint containment action
  2. Command-and-control beacon
  3. Self-propagating worm
  4. File-infecting virus

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Worms can spread automatically through vulnerable network paths without needing a human to launch each copy; that mechanism makes this classification more precise than the neighboring terms. The protective follow-up is to patch exposed network services and isolate infected subnets to interrupt propagation, verified when traffic monitoring shows propagation attempts blocked and infected hosts removed from affected networks.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Containment limits active compromise before extensive investigation or full eradication is complete; this different classification would fit when an infected laptop continues contacting internal systems while responders collect screenshots for a report, not the evidence pointing to self-propagating worm in the question.

B:

Beaconing can reveal automated communications from compromised endpoints to a remote controller; this different classification would fit when a workstation periodically contacts an unusual external host with similar request sizes at regular intervals, not the evidence pointing to self-propagating worm in the question.

D:

Viruses reproduce by infecting host files and normally rely on execution to spread infection; this different classification would fit when a malicious program inserts its code into other executable files that later run on the same host, not the evidence pointing to self-propagating worm in the question.

Certified Ethical Hacker v13 (312-50v13) Practice Tests