Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 (Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator) Practice Test 53

Question 520

The accepted design for the airport office requires the ability to limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses. Which switch feature is the closest fit?

  1. Enable IPv4 source guard on an access port
  2. Configure an authorized DHCP server list
  3. Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host
  4. Apply IPv6 RA guard where supported

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The relevant mechanism is: server whitelisting can narrow acceptable DHCP sources beyond the physical trust-port arrangement. The operator can test this claim by the specific check: inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Compared with the requested “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” at the airport office, this would discard host IP packets that use source addresses not authorized for that interface instead: IP source guard matches IPv4 origin against static or DHCP-snooping-learned source bindings. At the airport office, the operational proof would instead be to inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted, whereas “Enable IPv4 source guard on an access port” is validated by a different test: compare the source IP of rejected traffic with the allowed binding set.

C:

Compared with the requested “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” at the airport office, this would protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease instead: a static port/IP/MAC binding supplies known information for binding-aware protections. At the airport office, the operational proof would instead be to inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted, whereas “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” is validated by a different test: inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity.

D:

For the airport office, “Apply IPv6 RA guard where supported” is a different type of control from “Configure an authorized DHCP server list”: RA guard filters IPv6 router advertisements originating from untrusted switch access links. Unlike the requested feature, that setting addresses the need to block unauthorized IPv6 router advertisements on user-facing ports, not the objective to limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses.

Question 521

The operator has decided to configure an authorized DHCP server list on a newly commissioned floor switch at the conference venue. Which operational behavior is the most reasonable expectation of that specific feature?

  1. MAC-based VLAN policies identify permitted source MAC addresses and map them to VLANs
  2. Server whitelisting can narrow acceptable DHCP sources beyond the physical trust-port arrangement
  3. Dynamic source-guard entries depend on valid snooping bindings for the interface and source identity
  4. DHCP snooping checks DHCP packets on the VLAN and builds trusted IP-to-MAC lease bindings

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This approach fits because the configured operation is meant to limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses. The most relevant validation is to inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted for the equipment at the conference venue.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This outcome would be relevant to “Use MAC-based VLAN classification” at the conference venue, not the task “Configure an authorized DHCP server list”; the other task is to assign a known endpoint to its designated VLAN independent of the access-port default. The action “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” targets a different result: server whitelisting can narrow acceptable DHCP sources beyond the physical trust-port arrangement; the proposed alternative would instead be checked by inspect the device MAC and the associated VLAN mapping rule.

C:

That behavior applies when engineers “Check DHCP-derived bindings for IP source guard”; the different operation “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” is intended to limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses. That different feature is verified by read the active binding after the move and compare it with the client's new port; for “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” on a newly commissioned floor switch, the relevant evidence is to inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted.

D:

That behavior applies when engineers “Enable DHCP snooping on an access VLAN”; the different operation “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” is intended to limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses. That different feature is verified by inspect DHCP snooping status and the learned bindings for that VLAN; for “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” on a newly commissioned floor switch, the relevant evidence is to inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted.

Question 522

A technician says “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” has solved the issue at the campus. Which diagnostic step would substantiate that claim?

  1. Correlate the rogue-server event with VLAN, port and packet source MAC
  2. Read the active binding after the move and compare it with the client's new port
  3. Inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted
  4. Send a test rogue offer and verify it is rejected on the client-facing port
  5. Compare ARP inspection statistics for the endpoint port and the relevant VLAN

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The critical distinction is that server whitelisting can narrow acceptable DHCP sources beyond the physical trust-port arrangement. Directly measuring that result demonstrates whether the step to limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses succeeded on a local switch administering branch clients.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This check is suited to “Investigate rogue DHCP offer logs” when trying to locate an untrusted server attached to a client-facing port, not to verify “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” at the campus. Checking “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” at the campus requires evidence of its own mechanism: server whitelisting can narrow acceptable DHCP sources beyond the physical trust-port arrangement; that is not the outcome measured by “Investigate rogue DHCP offer logs”.

B:

The proposed check concerns “Check DHCP-derived bindings for IP source guard” rather than “Configure an authorized DHCP server list”: dynamic source-guard entries depend on valid snooping bindings for the interface and source identity. For “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” on a local switch administering branch clients, a better test would be to inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted, which targets limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses rather than the alternative diagnostic “Check DHCP-derived bindings for IP source guard”.

D:

The proposed check concerns “Keep ordinary client ports DHCP-snooping untrusted” rather than “Configure an authorized DHCP server list”: untrusted ports are checked for invalid DHCP server activity and may log rogue-server detection. For “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” on a local switch administering branch clients, a better test would be to inspect the configured allowlist and observe whether an unlisted server offer is accepted, which targets limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses rather than the alternative diagnostic “Keep ordinary client ports DHCP-snooping untrusted”.

E:

This check is suited to “Keep DAI untrusted on endpoint interfaces” when trying to verify ARP statements made by clients rather than exempting them from inspection, not to verify “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” at the campus. Checking “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” at the campus requires evidence of its own mechanism: server whitelisting can narrow acceptable DHCP sources beyond the physical trust-port arrangement; that is not the outcome measured by “Keep DAI untrusted on endpoint interfaces”.

Question 523

A deployment review at the remote depot identifies this objective: identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request. Which FortiSwitch operation should be selected?

  1. Use MAC-based VLAN classification
  2. Enable DHCP snooping on an access VLAN
  3. Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host
  4. Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

That setting is appropriate here because option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure. This distinction is material to the remote depot, where the stated goal is to identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Compared with the requested “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” at the remote depot, this would assign a known endpoint to its designated VLAN independent of the access-port default instead: MAC-based VLAN policies identify permitted source MAC addresses and map them to VLANs. At the remote depot, the operational proof would instead be to capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields, whereas “Use MAC-based VLAN classification” is validated by a different test: inspect the device MAC and the associated VLAN mapping rule.

B:

Compared with the requested “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” at the remote depot, this would stop an untrusted access port from supplying rogue DHCP server messages instead: DHCP snooping checks DHCP packets on the VLAN and builds trusted IP-to-MAC lease bindings. At the remote depot, the operational proof would instead be to capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields, whereas “Enable DHCP snooping on an access VLAN” is validated by a different test: inspect DHCP snooping status and the learned bindings for that VLAN.

C:

For the remote depot, “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” is a different type of control from “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context”: a static port/IP/MAC binding supplies known information for binding-aware protections. Unlike the requested feature, that setting addresses the need to protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease, not the objective to identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request.

Question 524

A switch change for the branch office consists of this step: include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context. Which behavior reflects the purpose of that change?

  1. Untrusted ARP senders must match the permitted binding state to be forwarded
  2. Option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure
  3. Untrusted ports are checked for invalid DHCP server activity and may log rogue-server detection
  4. Dynamic source-guard entries depend on valid snooping bindings for the interface and source identity

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This is the precise control because the configured operation is meant to identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request. The most relevant validation is to capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields for the equipment at the branch office.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This outcome would be relevant to “Keep DAI untrusted on endpoint interfaces” at the branch office, not the task “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context”; the other task is to verify ARP statements made by clients rather than exempting them from inspection. The action “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” targets a different result: option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure; the proposed alternative would instead be checked by compare ARP inspection statistics for the endpoint port and the relevant VLAN.

C:

That behavior applies when engineers “Keep ordinary client ports DHCP-snooping untrusted”; the different operation “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” is intended to identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request. That different feature is verified by send a test rogue offer and verify it is rejected on the client-facing port; for “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” on a production FortiSwitch fabric, the relevant evidence is to capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields.

D:

That behavior applies when engineers “Check DHCP-derived bindings for IP source guard”; the different operation “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” is intended to identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request. That different feature is verified by read the active binding after the move and compare it with the client's new port; for “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” on a production FortiSwitch fabric, the relevant evidence is to capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields.

Question 525

After implementing “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context,” the site engineer needs to assess its actual effect on a newly racked distribution unit. Which test is the best match?

  1. Review ARP trust state on the uplink and confirm that host ports remain untrusted
  2. Compare observed frame rates with the selected per-port storm-control threshold
  3. Capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields
  4. Correlate the rogue-server event with VLAN, port and packet source MAC

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The implementation works because option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure. Directly measuring that result demonstrates whether the step to identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request succeeded on a newly racked distribution unit.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This check is suited to “Trust an infrastructure port for ARP inspection when justified” when trying to avoid inspecting ARP coming from an explicitly trusted network segment, not to verify “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” at the factory. Checking “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” at the factory requires evidence of its own mechanism: option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure; that is not the outcome measured by “Trust an infrastructure port for ARP inspection when justified”.

B:

The proposed check concerns “Set a storm-control threshold appropriate to link capacity” rather than “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context”: a configured rate threshold distinguishes permitted traffic load from a sustained storm. For “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” on a newly racked distribution unit, a better test would be to capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields, which targets identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request rather than the alternative diagnostic “Set a storm-control threshold appropriate to link capacity”.

D:

This check is suited to “Investigate rogue DHCP offer logs” when trying to locate an untrusted server attached to a client-facing port, not to verify “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” at the factory. Checking “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” at the factory requires evidence of its own mechanism: option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure; that is not the outcome measured by “Investigate rogue DHCP offer logs”.

Question 526

On two distribution switches in the distribution floor, the next task is to protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease. What is the appropriate configuration decision?

  1. Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host
  2. Check DHCP-derived bindings for IP source guard
  3. Use MAC-based VLAN classification
  4. Enable DHCP snooping on an access VLAN
  5. Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Given the described goal, a static port/IP/MAC binding supplies known information for binding-aware protections. The operator can test this claim by the specific check: inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Compared with the requested “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” at the distribution floor, this would explain why a recently moved DHCP client loses permitted IPv4 connectivity instead: dynamic source-guard entries depend on valid snooping bindings for the interface and source identity. At the distribution floor, the operational proof would instead be to inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity, whereas “Check DHCP-derived bindings for IP source guard” is validated by a different test: read the active binding after the move and compare it with the client's new port.

C:

Compared with the requested “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” at the distribution floor, this would assign a known endpoint to its designated VLAN independent of the access-port default instead: MAC-based VLAN policies identify permitted source MAC addresses and map them to VLANs. At the distribution floor, the operational proof would instead be to inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity, whereas “Use MAC-based VLAN classification” is validated by a different test: inspect the device MAC and the associated VLAN mapping rule.

D:

For the distribution floor, “Enable DHCP snooping on an access VLAN” is a different type of control from “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host”: DHCP snooping checks DHCP packets on the VLAN and builds trusted IP-to-MAC lease bindings. Unlike the requested feature, that setting addresses the need to stop an untrusted access port from supplying rogue DHCP server messages, not the objective to protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease.

E:

Compared with the requested “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” at the distribution floor, this would identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request instead: option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure. At the distribution floor, the operational proof would instead be to inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity, whereas “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” is validated by a different test: capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields.

Question 527

The operator has decided to create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host on a staging FortiSwitch at the media studio. Which operational behavior is the most reasonable expectation of that specific feature?

  1. Untrusted ports are checked for invalid DHCP server activity and may log rogue-server detection
  2. Untrusted ARP senders must match the permitted binding state to be forwarded
  3. A static port/IP/MAC binding supplies known information for binding-aware protections
  4. DHCP snooping can log the arrival of DHCP server packets on untrusted interfaces

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The switch behavior that matters is: the configured operation is meant to protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease. The most relevant validation is to inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity for the equipment at the media studio.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This outcome would be relevant to “Keep ordinary client ports DHCP-snooping untrusted” at the media studio, not the task “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host”; the other task is to prevent a connected endpoint from acting as an unauthorized address server. The action “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” targets a different result: a static port/IP/MAC binding supplies known information for binding-aware protections; the proposed alternative would instead be checked by send a test rogue offer and verify it is rejected on the client-facing port.

B:

That behavior applies when engineers “Keep DAI untrusted on endpoint interfaces”; the different operation “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” is intended to protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease. That different feature is verified by compare ARP inspection statistics for the endpoint port and the relevant VLAN; for “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” on a staging FortiSwitch, the relevant evidence is to inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity.

D:

That behavior applies when engineers “Investigate rogue DHCP offer logs”; the different operation “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” is intended to protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease. That different feature is verified by correlate the rogue-server event with VLAN, port and packet source MAC; for “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” on a staging FortiSwitch, the relevant evidence is to inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity.

Question 528

A design review at the data hall discusses “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host.” Select the TWO characteristics that belong to this feature. (Choose TWO.)

  1. Server whitelisting can narrow acceptable DHCP sources beyond the physical trust-port arrangement
  2. Inspect the configured static binding and verify the endpoint's actual source identity
  3. A static port/IP/MAC binding supplies known information for binding-aware protections
  4. A configured rate threshold distinguishes permitted traffic load from a sustained storm
  5. The switch can designate trusted ARP interfaces when the network design warrants an exception

Explanation

Correct Answers

B:

The stated check directly tests whether the intended function is active at the data hall. It provides evidence about “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” beyond ordinary link-up state on a carefully segmented Layer 2 network.

C:

At this network boundary, the described mechanism corresponds to the operation that administrators use to protect an endpoint whose address was not learned through a DHCP lease. The result should be observable on a carefully segmented Layer 2 network.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That characteristic reflects “Configure an authorized DHCP server list” rather than “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” at the data hall. Its actual role is to limit DHCP server acceptance to specified legitimate server addresses, a different configuration need.

D:

That characteristic reflects “Set a storm-control threshold appropriate to link capacity” rather than “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” at the data hall. Its actual role is to contain traffic bursts without discarding ordinary service announcements, a different configuration need.

E:

That characteristic reflects “Trust an infrastructure port for ARP inspection when justified” rather than “Create a static DHCP-snooping binding for a fixed-IP host” at the data hall. Its actual role is to avoid inspecting ARP coming from an explicitly trusted network segment, a different configuration need.

Question 529

A production incident in the development floor reveals the need to block ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC assertions on untrusted access ports. Which targeted FortiSwitch setting or method should the team use?

  1. Apply IPv6 RA guard where supported
  2. Enable IPv4 source guard on an access port
  3. Enable DHCP snooping on an access VLAN
  4. Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN
  5. Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

In this deployment, DAI consults valid binding information to reject spoofed ARP traffic before it can poison neighbors. This distinction is material to the development floor, where the stated goal is to block ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC assertions on untrusted access ports.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Compared with the requested “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” at the development floor, this would block unauthorized IPv6 router advertisements on user-facing ports instead: RA guard filters IPv6 router advertisements originating from untrusted switch access links. At the development floor, the operational proof would instead be to inspect per-VLAN ARP inspection drops after sending an invalid ARP advertisement, whereas “Apply IPv6 RA guard where supported” is validated by a different test: capture unauthorized ICMPv6 router advertisements and monitor guard drops.

B:

For the development floor, “Enable IPv4 source guard on an access port” is a different type of control from “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN”: IP source guard matches IPv4 origin against static or DHCP-snooping-learned source bindings. Unlike the requested feature, that setting addresses the need to discard host IP packets that use source addresses not authorized for that interface, not the objective to block ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC assertions on untrusted access ports.

C:

Compared with the requested “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” at the development floor, this would stop an untrusted access port from supplying rogue DHCP server messages instead: DHCP snooping checks DHCP packets on the VLAN and builds trusted IP-to-MAC lease bindings. At the development floor, the operational proof would instead be to inspect per-VLAN ARP inspection drops after sending an invalid ARP advertisement, whereas “Enable DHCP snooping on an access VLAN” is validated by a different test: inspect DHCP snooping status and the learned bindings for that VLAN.

E:

Compared with the requested “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” at the development floor, this would identify the access circuit or switch involved in a DHCP client request instead: option 82 carries relay-agent information such as circuit and remote identifiers toward the DHCP infrastructure. At the development floor, the operational proof would instead be to inspect per-VLAN ARP inspection drops after sending an invalid ARP advertisement, whereas “Include DHCP option 82 for relay-agent context” is validated by a different test: capture a forwarded DHCP discover and inspect its option-82 fields.

Question 530

On a FortiSwitch connected to the security edge, “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” is configured for the conference venue. What effect should an administrator expect without assuming unrelated features are enabled?

  1. Dynamic source-guard entries depend on valid snooping bindings for the interface and source identity
  2. DAI consults valid binding information to reject spoofed ARP traffic before it can poison neighbors
  3. Untrusted ARP senders must match the permitted binding state to be forwarded
  4. MAC-based VLAN policies identify permitted source MAC addresses and map them to VLANs

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For the stated requirement, the configured operation is meant to block ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC assertions on untrusted access ports. The most relevant validation is to inspect per-VLAN ARP inspection drops after sending an invalid ARP advertisement for the equipment at the conference venue.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This outcome would be relevant to “Check DHCP-derived bindings for IP source guard” at the conference venue, not the task “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN”; the other task is to explain why a recently moved DHCP client loses permitted IPv4 connectivity. The action “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” targets a different result: DAI consults valid binding information to reject spoofed ARP traffic before it can poison neighbors; the proposed alternative would instead be checked by read the active binding after the move and compare it with the client's new port.

C:

That behavior applies when engineers “Keep DAI untrusted on endpoint interfaces”; the different operation “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” is intended to block ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC assertions on untrusted access ports. That different feature is verified by compare ARP inspection statistics for the endpoint port and the relevant VLAN; for “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” on a FortiSwitch connected to the security edge, the relevant evidence is to inspect per-VLAN ARP inspection drops after sending an invalid ARP advertisement.

D:

That behavior applies when engineers “Use MAC-based VLAN classification”; the different operation “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” is intended to block ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC assertions on untrusted access ports. That different feature is verified by inspect the device MAC and the associated VLAN mapping rule; for “Enable dynamic ARP inspection on a VLAN” on a FortiSwitch connected to the security edge, the relevant evidence is to inspect per-VLAN ARP inspection drops after sending an invalid ARP advertisement.

Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator (NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6) Practice Tests