ECCouncil 212-89 (EC-Council Certified Incident Handler) Practice Test 5

Question 40

A mail-domain owner wants receivers to validate authorized sending IPs and also check a cryptographic signature over selected email content. Which TWO mechanisms meet those separate goals? Choose TWO.

  1. Confirm the change using a previously trusted out-of-band contact
  2. Review DMARC aggregate reports from receiving domains
  3. Publish an appropriate SPF policy for authorized mail servers
  4. Publish a DMARC policy with domain alignment rules
  5. Use DKIM signing and validate its signature

Explanation

Correct Answers

C:

SPF associates sending IPs with the envelope domain using DNS records as part of the combined response plan. It does not cryptographically sign message content and requires alignment to help DMARC while the team also addresses cryptographic integrity for signed email content.

E:

DKIM verifies signed message components with a public key published in DNS as part of the combined response plan. It authenticates a signing domain, while alignment to the visible From domain is evaluated separately while the team also addresses authorization of sending infrastructure by IP.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A known independent phone or supplier portal avoids replying through a potentially compromised mailbox; that is separate from authorization of sending infrastructure by IP and cryptographic integrity for signed email content, so it would leave the responder without the required control or evidence.

B:

Aggregate reports summarize authentication and alignment outcomes by sending source; because the case hinges on authorization of sending infrastructure by IP and cryptographic integrity for signed email content, this option would be an incomplete or mistimed response.

D:

DMARC evaluates aligned SPF or DKIM authentication and publishes requested disposition and reporting preferences; the case requires authorization of sending infrastructure by IP and cryptographic integrity for signed email content; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.

Question 41

A security team wants to inspect suspicious traffic and raise alerts without dropping packets. What type of network control fits?

  1. Apply a narrowly scoped firewall deny rule
  2. Use network detection and response behavior analytics
  3. Classify the pattern as probable port reconnaissance
  4. Use an inline intrusion prevention policy
  5. Deploy network intrusion detection in a monitoring position

Explanation

Correct Answer

E:

An IDS observes traffic and reports suspicious patterns without directly blocking a flow. Its visibility depends on tap or mirror placement and encrypted traffic limitations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Firewall policy can restrict defined sources, destinations, and services; because the case hinges on passive network threat alerting, this option would be an incomplete or mistimed response.

B:

NDR can find anomalous communication patterns and support investigation of lateral movement; this action does not meet passive network threat alerting under the circumstances specified in the question.

C:

Broad connection probes often map exposed services before exploitation; the case requires passive network threat alerting; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.

D:

An IPS can drop or reset matching traffic when placed on the forwarding path; here the immediate decision turns on passive network threat alerting, not the separate objective served by this response.

Question 42

An application repeatedly serves malicious scripts from stored customer comments. The team must identify that flaw and temporarily constrain browser script execution while developers fix it. Which TWO measures fit? Choose TWO.

  1. Investigate stored cross-site scripting in persisted content
  2. Investigate reflected cross-site scripting in the response
  3. Invalidate exposed sessions and rotate session identifiers
  4. Assess DOM-based cross-site scripting in browser code
  5. Deploy a restrictive tested Content Security Policy

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

Untrusted content saved by the application can execute in subsequent visitors' browsers as part of the combined response plan. The payload's storage location and rendering path distinguish this from a one-time reflected request while the team also addresses restriction of unintended browser script execution.

E:

CSP can constrain script sources and execution behavior as part of the combined response plan. It is not a substitute for fixing unsafe rendering paths and must be tuned for the application while the team also addresses recognition of persistent user-content script execution.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Reflected XSS occurs when untrusted request input is returned without safe contextual encoding; the case requires recognition of persistent user-content script execution and restriction of unintended browser script execution; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.

C:

Server-side invalidation prevents continued use of captured session material; here the immediate decision turns on recognition of persistent user-content script execution and restriction of unintended browser script execution, not the separate objective served by this response.

D:

DOM XSS can arise entirely in client-side sinks even when server responses are unchanged; it leaves the stated requirement—recognition of persistent user-content script execution and restriction of unintended browser script execution—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.

Question 43

An AWS security investigation requires three different kinds of evidence: who called management APIs, which managed threat detections fired, and what IP flows reached a suspect EC2 interface. Which THREE sources match those needs? Choose THREE.

  1. Examine AWS CloudTrail management events
  2. Review Amazon VPC Flow Logs for affected interfaces
  3. Analyze GuardDuty threat-detection findings and their supporting context
  4. Deactivate the exposed access key and replace it securely
  5. Review resource configuration history using AWS Config where enabled

Explanation

Correct Answers

A:

CloudTrail records many AWS API activities with principal, time, and request context as part of the combined response plan. Retention and delivery configuration affect how far back investigators can search while the team also addresses interpretation of a managed AWS threat finding.

B:

VPC Flow Logs describe IP traffic flows at supported network interfaces as part of the combined response plan. They do not capture the full packet payload or every application-level action while the team also addresses attribution of AWS control-plane API changes.

C:

GuardDuty identifies potentially malicious behavior using supported AWS telemetry and intelligence as part of the combined response plan. Its findings are detection leads, not a complete replacement for underlying event records while the team also addresses attribution of AWS control-plane API changes.

Incorrect Answers

D:

Long-lived keys can be reused outside the original system, so active material must be invalidated; for the described evidence and constraints, attribution of AWS control-plane API changes and interpretation of a managed AWS threat finding and network-flow evidence from AWS virtual networking must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.

E:

AWS Config can record supported resource configuration changes and compliance context; the scenario asks for attribution of AWS control-plane API changes and interpretation of a managed AWS threat finding and network-flow evidence from AWS virtual networking. This alternative does not provide that particular investigation or containment result.

Question 44

A staff member downloads far more restricted files than usual immediately before departure. What should the SOC evaluate?

  1. Investigate anomalous bulk access with business and HR context
  2. Establish role- and peer-aware behavioral baselines
  3. Assess access outside the employee's normal authorization purpose
  4. Correlate print jobs with document labels and approvals
  5. Treat timing as one risk indicator requiring corroboration

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Unusual download volume can signal exfiltration but may reflect legitimate handoff work. Access logs, approvals, and employment context are needed for a defensible finding.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Meaningful thresholds consider job functions and historical usage; it leaves the stated requirement—validation of departure-related bulk data access—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.

C:

Anomalous resource selection may reveal inappropriate access even with valid credentials; for the described evidence and constraints, validation of departure-related bulk data access must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.

D:

Print records can connect documents, times, and users to physical disclosure opportunities; the scenario asks for validation of departure-related bulk data access. This alternative does not provide that particular investigation or containment result.

E:

Off-hours access may be legitimate for global teams or deadlines; it can support an adjacent task, but it does not satisfy the scenario’s core need for validation of departure-related bulk data access.

Question 45

Investigators need to establish successful Windows logons and associated account context. Which source is useful?

  1. Review Windows SRUM data where available
  2. Examine Amcache metadata alongside other execution evidence
  3. Inspect available Prefetch artifacts with interpretation limits
  4. Review Windows Security authentication events such as event 4624
  5. Review SSH authentication records in journald or distribution logs

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Successful logon events can record account and logon type details if auditing is enabled. Interpretation requires correlation because service and network logons may be routine.

Incorrect Answers

A:

SRUM can provide application and network resource usage information on supported systems; it leaves the stated requirement—Windows evidence of successful authentication—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.

B:

Amcache can contain file and program metadata useful for historical analysis; for the described evidence and constraints, Windows evidence of successful authentication must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.

C:

Prefetch can indicate program execution and associated paths on supported systems; the scenario asks for Windows evidence of successful authentication. This alternative does not provide that particular investigation or containment result.

E:

Authentication records can show success, failure, and source context depending on configuration; by itself, it cannot deliver Windows evidence of successful authentication, which is the decision point distinguished by the available evidence.

Question 46

A response bridge has multiple investigators and rapidly changing facts. What role should capture decisions, evidence references, and timestamps?

  1. Involve legal counsel and authorized HR leadership
  2. Assign a dedicated incident scribe
  3. Maintain an asset inventory with business-service dependencies
  4. Appoint an incident commander with decision authority
  5. Route external messaging through an approved communications lead

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A designated recorder maintains a defensible chronology of actions and reasons. That record supports handoffs, post-incident review, and accurate communications without distracting technical responders.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Counsel and HR can determine lawful scope, preservation duties, and employee-process safeguards; by itself, it cannot deliver an authoritative chronological incident log, which is the decision point distinguished by the available evidence.

C:

Dependency mapping connects hosts, owners, and critical processes; that is separate from an authoritative chronological incident log, so it would leave the responder without the required control or evidence.

D:

A named incident lead resolves competing objectives and maintains a single operational picture; because the case hinges on an authoritative chronological incident log, this option would be an incomplete or mistimed response.

E:

A designated spokesperson can reconcile verified facts and notification approvals; this action does not meet an authoritative chronological incident log under the circumstances specified in the question.

Question 47

A seized laptop and its external drive have similar appearances. How should the evidence team prevent accidental interchange?

  1. Create a dated chain-of-custody record with each handoff
  2. Record a cryptographic hash of the acquired image
  3. Assign unique evidence identifiers and labels
  4. Capture a timestamped network connection table from the live host
  5. Document the seal condition and escalate the discrepancy

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Unique identifiers link each physical item to photographs, notes, and acquisition records. Generic descriptions are insufficient when multiple devices look alike.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Custody records establish possession, timing, purpose, and receiving parties; the stated observations instead call for unambiguous identity of each seized item; using this approach would address a different failure mode.

B:

A suitable hash supports repeatable integrity comparisons of digital evidence; that is separate from unambiguous identity of each seized item, so it would leave the responder without the required control or evidence.

D:

Connection state can link local processes and remote addresses during the observation window; this action does not meet unambiguous identity of each seized item under the circumstances specified in the question.

E:

A broken or altered seal is a custody anomaly that requires contemporaneous recording; the case requires unambiguous identity of each seized item; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.

Question 48

A worm is exploiting a service reachable between branch networks. What control is most useful while patching proceeds?

  1. Detonate the sample in an instrumented isolated sandbox
  2. Examine service inventory and detection coverage gaps
  3. Investigate autonomous worm-like propagation
  4. Search for additional compromised nodes and independent propagation chains
  5. Restrict lateral reachability to the vulnerable service

Explanation

Correct Answer

E:

Temporary segmentation interrupts cross-segment propagation. It reduces the exploitable path before every endpoint can be remediated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Dynamic analysis records actual behaviors under defined conditions; that is separate from containment of a shared worm propagation channel, so it would leave the responder without the required control or evidence.

B:

A post-incident gap analysis compares vulnerable exposure with sensor placement and alerting; because the case hinges on containment of a shared worm propagation channel, this option would be an incomplete or mistimed response.

C:

Worms can move through vulnerable services or network paths without each victim's direct user action; this action does not meet containment of a shared worm propagation channel under the circumstances specified in the question.

D:

A spreading worm may establish several secondary sources; the case requires containment of a shared worm propagation channel; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.

Question 49

A recipient needs cryptographic assurance that signed header and body fields were not changed in transit. Which technology addresses this?

  1. Examine sender-domain impersonation and coercive payment language
  2. Use DKIM signing and validate its signature
  3. Publish an appropriate SPF policy for authorized mail servers
  4. Review DMARC aggregate reports from receiving domains
  5. Publish a DMARC policy with domain alignment rules

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

DKIM verifies signed message components with a public key published in DNS. It authenticates a signing domain, while alignment to the visible From domain is evaluated separately.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Lookalike domains and unusual urgency often signal impersonation fraud; because the case hinges on cryptographic integrity for signed email content, this option would be an incomplete or mistimed response.

C:

SPF associates sending IPs with the envelope domain using DNS records; the case requires cryptographic integrity for signed email content; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.

D:

Aggregate reports summarize authentication and alignment outcomes by sending source; here the immediate decision turns on cryptographic integrity for signed email content, not the separate objective served by this response.

E:

DMARC evaluates aligned SPF or DKIM authentication and publishes requested disposition and reporting preferences; it leaves the stated requirement—cryptographic integrity for signed email content—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.

Question 50

An organization needs the sensor to reject a confirmed malicious exploit signature inline. Which capability is appropriate?

  1. Use network detection and response behavior analytics
  2. Use an inline intrusion prevention policy
  3. Deploy network intrusion detection in a monitoring position
  4. Apply a narrowly scoped firewall deny rule
  5. Investigate targeted password guessing against the identity

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

An IPS can drop or reset matching traffic when placed on the forwarding path. False positives and availability requirements must be considered before strict blocking.

Incorrect Answers

A:

NDR can find anomalous communication patterns and support investigation of lateral movement; this action does not meet active inline rejection of known exploit traffic under the circumstances specified in the question.

C:

An IDS observes traffic and reports suspicious patterns without directly blocking a flow; here the immediate decision turns on active inline rejection of known exploit traffic, not the separate objective served by this response.

D:

Firewall policy can restrict defined sources, destinations, and services; it leaves the stated requirement—active inline rejection of known exploit traffic—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.

E:

Repeated authentication failures for a single identity can indicate brute-force attempts; for the described evidence and constraints, active inline rejection of known exploit traffic must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.

EC-Council Certified Incident Handler (212-89) Practice Tests