Question 50
An organization needs the sensor to reject a confirmed malicious exploit signature inline. Which capability is appropriate?
- Use network detection and response behavior analytics
- Use an inline intrusion prevention policy
- Deploy network intrusion detection in a monitoring position
- Apply a narrowly scoped firewall deny rule
- Investigate targeted password guessing against the identity
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:An IPS can drop or reset matching traffic when placed on the forwarding path. False positives and availability requirements must be considered before strict blocking.
Incorrect Answers
A:NDR can find anomalous communication patterns and support investigation of lateral movement; this action does not meet active inline rejection of known exploit traffic under the circumstances specified in the question.
C:An IDS observes traffic and reports suspicious patterns without directly blocking a flow; here the immediate decision turns on active inline rejection of known exploit traffic, not the separate objective served by this response.
D:Firewall policy can restrict defined sources, destinations, and services; it leaves the stated requirement—active inline rejection of known exploit traffic—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.
E:Repeated authentication failures for a single identity can indicate brute-force attempts; for the described evidence and constraints, active inline rejection of known exploit traffic must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.
Question 51
A malicious URL parameter is immediately echoed into one response page and executes in the browser. Which issue should be examined?
- Set the session cookie HttpOnly attribute
- Investigate reflected cross-site scripting in the response
- Deploy a restrictive tested Content Security Policy
- Assess DOM-based cross-site scripting in browser code
- Investigate stored cross-site scripting in persisted content
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Reflected XSS occurs when untrusted request input is returned without safe contextual encoding. It need not be stored in the server database.
Incorrect Answers
A:HttpOnly prevents normal page JavaScript from reading the cookie value; the case requires identification of request-reflected client script execution; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.
C:CSP can constrain script sources and execution behavior; it leaves the stated requirement—identification of request-reflected client script execution—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.
D:DOM XSS can arise entirely in client-side sinks even when server responses are unchanged; for the described evidence and constraints, identification of request-reflected client script execution must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.
E:Untrusted content saved by the application can execute in subsequent visitors' browsers; the scenario asks for identification of request-reflected client script execution. This alternative does not provide that particular investigation or containment result.
Question 52
A GuardDuty finding reports unusual API calls from a possibly compromised IAM identity. What does GuardDuty primarily provide?
- Analyze GuardDuty threat-detection findings and their supporting context
- Revoke or constrain affected role sessions and repair the credential exposure
- Review Amazon VPC Flow Logs for affected interfaces
- Review resource configuration history using AWS Config where enabled
- Examine AWS CloudTrail management events
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:GuardDuty identifies potentially malicious behavior using supported AWS telemetry and intelligence. Its findings are detection leads, not a complete replacement for underlying event records.
Incorrect Answers
B:Temporary credentials have lifetimes and role-based privileges independent of user passwords; it leaves the stated requirement—interpretation of a managed AWS threat finding—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.
C:VPC Flow Logs describe IP traffic flows at supported network interfaces; for the described evidence and constraints, interpretation of a managed AWS threat finding must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.
D:AWS Config can record supported resource configuration changes and compliance context; the scenario asks for interpretation of a managed AWS threat finding. This alternative does not provide that particular investigation or containment result.
E:CloudTrail records many AWS API activities with principal, time, and request context; it can support an adjacent task, but it does not satisfy the scenario’s core need for interpretation of a managed AWS threat finding.
Question 53
A user begins repeatedly visiting sensitive repositories outside their assigned duties. Which signal is relevant?
- Validate the alert against approved assignments and change records
- Treat timing as one risk indicator requiring corroboration
- Investigate anomalous bulk access with business and HR context
- Correlate print jobs with document labels and approvals
- Assess access outside the employee's normal authorization purpose
Explanation
Correct Answer
E:Anomalous resource selection may reveal inappropriate access even with valid credentials. Analysts should compare role requirements and change history before escalating.
Incorrect Answers
A:UEBA produces risk signals, not independent proof of malicious intent; it leaves the stated requirement—role-inconsistent access to sensitive repositories—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.
B:Off-hours access may be legitimate for global teams or deadlines; for the described evidence and constraints, role-inconsistent access to sensitive repositories must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.
C:Unusual download volume can signal exfiltration but may reflect legitimate handoff work; the scenario asks for role-inconsistent access to sensitive repositories. This alternative does not provide that particular investigation or containment result.
D:Print records can connect documents, times, and users to physical disclosure opportunities; it can support an adjacent task, but it does not satisfy the scenario’s core need for role-inconsistent access to sensitive repositories.
Question 54
A workstation may have executed a suspicious program previously, but the binary is gone. Which Windows artifact can help with execution history?
- Review Windows Security authentication events such as event 4624
- Inspect available Prefetch artifacts with interpretation limits
- Examine Amcache metadata alongside other execution evidence
- Review Windows SRUM data where available
- Inspect cron definitions and scheduled timer units
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Prefetch can indicate program execution and associated paths on supported systems. Its availability depends on configuration and does not provide every execution detail.
Incorrect Answers
A:Successful logon events can record account and logon type details if auditing is enabled; for the described evidence and constraints, historical hints of Windows program execution must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.
C:Amcache can contain file and program metadata useful for historical analysis; it can support an adjacent task, but it does not satisfy the scenario’s core need for historical hints of Windows program execution.
D:SRUM can provide application and network resource usage information on supported systems; by itself, it cannot deliver historical hints of Windows program execution, which is the decision point distinguished by the available evidence.
E:Scheduled jobs and systemd timers can execute commands at repeated intervals; the stated observations instead call for historical hints of Windows program execution; using this approach would address a different failure mode.
Question 55
Evidence suggests employee misconduct and possible legal discovery obligations. Which stakeholder should shape investigation boundaries before personnel data is searched?
- Appoint an incident commander with decision authority
- Assign a dedicated incident scribe
- Set centralized log retention to investigation requirements
- Involve legal counsel and authorized HR leadership
- Route external messaging through an approved communications lead
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Counsel and HR can determine lawful scope, preservation duties, and employee-process safeguards. Technical access alone does not establish authority to inspect private employee information.
Incorrect Answers
A:A named incident lead resolves competing objectives and maintains a single operational picture; the stated observations instead call for lawful employee-investigation scope; using this approach would address a different failure mode.
B:A designated recorder maintains a defensible chronology of actions and reasons; that is separate from lawful employee-investigation scope, so it would leave the responder without the required control or evidence.
C:A defined retention policy ensures necessary events survive long enough for detection and investigation; because the case hinges on lawful employee-investigation scope, this option would be an incomplete or mistimed response.
E:A designated spokesperson can reconcile verified facts and notification approvals; the case requires lawful employee-investigation scope; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.
Question 56
An analyst acquires a drive and wants to detect later changes to the image. What should be computed and preserved?
- Acquire the relevant nonvolatile file from storage
- Create a dated chain-of-custody record with each handoff
- Document the seal condition and escalate the discrepancy
- Assign unique evidence identifiers and labels
- Record a cryptographic hash of the acquired image
Explanation
Correct Answer
E:A suitable hash supports repeatable integrity comparisons of digital evidence. Matching values corroborate unchanged bytes but do not independently prove the source or lawful collection.
Incorrect Answers
A:A persistent file can be preserved through a controlled filesystem or disk acquisition; that is separate from byte-integrity verification of the acquired data, so it would leave the responder without the required control or evidence.
B:Custody records establish possession, timing, purpose, and receiving parties; because the case hinges on byte-integrity verification of the acquired data, this option would be an incomplete or mistimed response.
C:A broken or altered seal is a custody anomaly that requires contemporaneous recording; this action does not meet byte-integrity verification of the acquired data under the circumstances specified in the question.
D:Unique identifiers link each physical item to photographs, notes, and acquisition records; the case requires byte-integrity verification of the acquired data; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.
Question 57
New infections continue after the original patient-zero host has been isolated. What should investigators infer?
- Search for additional compromised nodes and independent propagation chains
- Investigate autonomous worm-like propagation
- Use a validated signature or hash-based indicator
- Restrict lateral reachability to the vulnerable service
- Examine service inventory and detection coverage gaps
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:A spreading worm may establish several secondary sources. Focusing only on the first victim misses hosts that can continue to infect others.
Incorrect Answers
B:Worms can move through vulnerable services or network paths without each victim's direct user action; this action does not meet identification of secondary outbreak sources under the circumstances specified in the question.
C:Known-pattern detection efficiently identifies matching artifacts; the case requires identification of secondary outbreak sources; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.
D:Temporary segmentation interrupts cross-segment propagation; here the immediate decision turns on identification of secondary outbreak sources, not the separate objective served by this response.
E:A post-incident gap analysis compares vulnerable exposure with sensor placement and alerting; it leaves the stated requirement—identification of secondary outbreak sources—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.
Question 58
A company wants mail receivers to enforce policy when SPF and DKIM do not align with the visible sender domain. What should it configure?
- Publish an appropriate SPF policy for authorized mail servers
- Use DKIM signing and validate its signature
- Contain the legitimate account takeover and validate affected transactions
- Publish a DMARC policy with domain alignment rules
- Review DMARC aggregate reports from receiving domains
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:DMARC evaluates aligned SPF or DKIM authentication and publishes requested disposition and reporting preferences. It builds on those mechanisms rather than replacing them.
Incorrect Answers
A:SPF associates sending IPs with the envelope domain using DNS records; this action does not meet policy treatment of unauthenticated visible-From domain use under the circumstances specified in the question.
B:DKIM verifies signed message components with a public key published in DNS; the case requires policy treatment of unauthenticated visible-From domain use; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.
C:Compromised genuine mailboxes can pass ordinary domain-authentication checks; here the immediate decision turns on policy treatment of unauthenticated visible-From domain use, not the separate objective served by this response.
E:Aggregate reports summarize authentication and alignment outcomes by sending source; for the described evidence and constraints, policy treatment of unauthenticated visible-From domain use must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.
Question 59
A responder must stop connections to a confirmed malicious server on a defined port across an edge zone. What control provides a simple path block?
- Use network detection and response behavior analytics
- Investigate password spraying across identities
- Deploy network intrusion detection in a monitoring position
- Use an inline intrusion prevention policy
- Apply a narrowly scoped firewall deny rule
Explanation
Correct Answer
E:Firewall policy can restrict defined sources, destinations, and services. It does not provide a detailed explanation of every application transaction carried by allowed traffic.
Incorrect Answers
A:NDR can find anomalous communication patterns and support investigation of lateral movement; the case requires enforcement of a network access block; that distinct outcome is not produced by this measure alone.
B:Spraying spreads authentication attempts over many accounts to avoid per-account lockouts; here the immediate decision turns on enforcement of a network access block, not the separate objective served by this response.
C:An IDS observes traffic and reports suspicious patterns without directly blocking a flow; it leaves the stated requirement—enforcement of a network access block—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.
D:An IPS can drop or reset matching traffic when placed on the forwarding path; for the described evidence and constraints, enforcement of a network access block must be achieved first; this pursues a different result.
Question 60
A client-side framework reads an attacker-controlled URL fragment and inserts it as HTML. What XSS variant is plausible?
- Investigate reflected cross-site scripting in the response
- Investigate stored cross-site scripting in persisted content
- Assess DOM-based cross-site scripting in browser code
- Require the Secure attribute for session cookies
- Deploy a restrictive tested Content Security Policy
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:DOM XSS can arise entirely in client-side sinks even when server responses are unchanged. Safe DOM APIs and context-aware encoding are important.
Incorrect Answers
A:Reflected XSS occurs when untrusted request input is returned without safe contextual encoding; here the immediate decision turns on client-side rendering of unsafe URL-derived content, not the separate objective served by this response.
B:Untrusted content saved by the application can execute in subsequent visitors' browsers; it leaves the stated requirement—client-side rendering of unsafe URL-derived content—unresolved, even though it can help in another response stage.
D:Secure instructs compliant browsers to send the cookie over protected HTTPS connections; the scenario asks for client-side rendering of unsafe URL-derived content. This alternative does not provide that particular investigation or containment result.
E:CSP can constrain script sources and execution behavior; it can support an adjacent task, but it does not satisfy the scenario’s core need for client-side rendering of unsafe URL-derived content.