Question 30
During troubleshooting of the rail signaling depot, the operator confirms that the asset dashboard omits the OT vulnerability context needed for identifying devices with known exploited flaws. What is the most targeted response?
- Review the interface signature-exclusion settings for OT and IoT discovery
- Confirm device identification and necessary security-profile processing for IoT/OT visibility
- Disable all UTM processing while expecting the same enrichment
- Check the Operational Technology Security Service entitlement under FortiGuard subscriptions
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:For the stated gap at the rail signaling depot, device identity processing and relevant inspected traffic supply asset attributes that enable enriched vulnerability views; that directly resolves the requirement that the asset dashboard omits the OT vulnerability context needed for identifying devices with known exploited flaws.
Incorrect Answers
A:At the rail signaling depot, this mechanism serves the separate situation where OT and IoT signatures are inadvertently excluded from the detection configuration on a FortiGate interface, whereas the present finding is that the asset dashboard omits the OT vulnerability context needed for identifying devices with known exploited flaws; although excluded signature categories suppress matching for those device types and reduce available asset details, the required capability remains missing.
C:At the rail signaling depot, that alternative is insufficient because disabling inspection can remove observations needed to associate assets with vulnerability information; it leaves unresolved the finding that the asset dashboard omits the OT vulnerability context needed for identifying devices with known exploited flaws.
D:At the rail signaling depot, this mechanism serves the separate situation where the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures, whereas the present finding is that the asset dashboard omits the OT vulnerability context needed for identifying devices with known exploited flaws; although license entitlement governs access to the dedicated OT security signature updates, the required capability remains missing.
Question 31
A security assessment of the building-management control network records two issues: (1) the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected; and (2) OT asset intelligence shows a known exploited vulnerability in a controller but the maintenance patch is deferred. Which plan provides the needed control for each finding rather than a superficial substitute?
- Enable appropriate industrial-protocol IPS inspection on the matching FortiGate policy; then remove the vulnerability from the asset inventory because the patch is delayed
- Enable appropriate industrial-protocol IPS inspection on the matching FortiGate policy; then prioritize a temporary validated network mitigation and track the residual remediation task
- Use only a destination-port allow rule with no inspection profile; then prioritize a temporary validated network mitigation and track the residual remediation task
- Use only a destination-port allow rule with no inspection profile; then remove the vulnerability from the asset inventory because the patch is delayed
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The first control fits because an OT-aware IPS signature can evaluate malicious commands or exploit patterns beyond just the transport port; the second fits because KEV context raises exploit concern while temporary protection should remain linked to the eventual vendor fix. Together they resolve the separate findings at the building-management control network: the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected, and OT asset intelligence shows a known exploited vulnerability in a controller but the maintenance patch is deferred. This addresses the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected without bypassing the separate requirement that OT asset intelligence shows a known exploited vulnerability in a controller but the maintenance patch is deferred.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first action is suitable because an OT-aware IPS signature can evaluate malicious commands or exploit patterns beyond just the transport port; the second is misdirected because suppressing the record does not reduce the underlying likelihood or impact. At the building-management control network, the remaining second gap is that OT asset intelligence shows a known exploited vulnerability in a controller but the maintenance patch is deferred, even though the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected is covered.
C:The second part is useful because KEV context raises exploit concern while temporary protection should remain linked to the eventual vendor fix; however, the first part fails because a transport permit has no intrinsic understanding of payload-level exploit indicators. The first gap remains unresolved at the building-management control network: the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected; the second measure helps with OT asset intelligence shows a known exploited vulnerability in a controller but the maintenance patch is deferred but cannot repair it.
D:The first substitution fails because a transport permit has no intrinsic understanding of payload-level exploit indicators; the second fails because suppressing the record does not reduce the underlying likelihood or impact. For this building-management control network, the first finding is that the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected, while the other is that OT asset intelligence shows a known exploited vulnerability in a controller but the maintenance patch is deferred; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
Question 32
An OT architect reviewing the rail signaling depot observes two independent gaps: (1) the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures; and (2) FortiNAC sees an unknown MAC address connected to a switch but the host has not been registered. Which proposal would pass both acceptance tests with the fewest irrelevant changes?
- Check the Operational Technology Security Service entitlement under FortiGuard subscriptions; then investigate the rogue-host record and allow the profiling workflow to classify it
- Assume a default route alone proves OT signature licensing; then investigate the rogue-host record and allow the profiling workflow to classify it
- Check the Operational Technology Security Service entitlement under FortiGuard subscriptions; then automatically declare every new MAC address a trusted PLC
- Assume a default route alone proves OT signature licensing; then automatically declare every new MAC address a trusted PLC
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The first control fits because license entitlement governs access to the dedicated OT security signature updates; the second fits because an unrecognized MAC is initially tracked as a rogue and can be evaluated against profiling criteria once observations are available. Together they resolve the separate findings at the rail signaling depot: the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures, and FortiNAC sees an unknown MAC address connected to a switch but the host has not been registered. This addresses the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures without bypassing the separate requirement that FortiNAC sees an unknown MAC address connected to a switch but the host has not been registered.
Incorrect Answers
B:The second part is useful because an unrecognized MAC is initially tracked as a rogue and can be evaluated against profiling criteria once observations are available; however, the first part fails because Internet reachability by itself does not activate a subscription that has not been licensed. The first gap remains unresolved at the rail signaling depot: the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures; the second measure helps with FortiNAC sees an unknown MAC address connected to a switch but the host has not been registered but cannot repair it.
C:The first action is suitable because license entitlement governs access to the dedicated OT security signature updates; the second is misdirected because unknown attachment does not by itself establish a controller identity or trust status. At the rail signaling depot, the remaining second gap is that FortiNAC sees an unknown MAC address connected to a switch but the host has not been registered, even though the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures is covered.
D:The first substitution fails because Internet reachability by itself does not activate a subscription that has not been licensed; the second fails because unknown attachment does not by itself establish a controller identity or trust status. For this rail signaling depot, the first finding is that the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures, while the other is that FortiNAC sees an unknown MAC address connected to a switch but the host has not been registered; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
Question 33
An OT architect reviewing the automated packaging warehouse observes two independent gaps: (1) inspection cannot identify a command in encrypted application traffic because only ciphertext crosses the firewall; and (2) a device has an identified vulnerability but its vendor update cannot be applied until the next outage. Which joint design is aligned with the exact detection and enforcement gaps?
- Evaluate supported decryption or a suitable alternative inspection point within safety constraints; then apply appropriate virtual patching coverage to the matching device traffic
- Increase the logging retention time while leaving the payload encrypted; then apply appropriate virtual patching coverage to the matching device traffic
- Evaluate supported decryption or a suitable alternative inspection point within safety constraints; then declare the endpoint permanently remediated without testing the mitigation
- Increase the logging retention time while leaving the payload encrypted; then declare the endpoint permanently remediated without testing the mitigation
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:The first control fits because a payload analyzer cannot interpret encrypted commands unless the necessary content becomes visible at a trusted point; the second fits because virtual patching can use vulnerability-linked network mitigations without changing the controller firmware immediately. Together they resolve the separate findings at the automated packaging warehouse: inspection cannot identify a command in encrypted application traffic because only ciphertext crosses the firewall, and a device has an identified vulnerability but its vendor update cannot be applied until the next outage. This addresses inspection cannot identify a command in encrypted application traffic because only ciphertext crosses the firewall without bypassing the separate requirement that a device has an identified vulnerability but its vendor update cannot be applied until the next outage.
Incorrect Answers
B:The second part is useful because virtual patching can use vulnerability-linked network mitigations without changing the controller firmware immediately; however, the first part fails because storing more ciphertext does not create visibility into its application-layer command. The first gap remains unresolved at the automated packaging warehouse: inspection cannot identify a command in encrypted application traffic because only ciphertext crosses the firewall; the second measure helps with a device has an identified vulnerability but its vendor update cannot be applied until the next outage but cannot repair it.
C:The first action is suitable because a payload analyzer cannot interpret encrypted commands unless the necessary content becomes visible at a trusted point; the second is misdirected because a network workaround does not replace the underlying vendor patch or validate the residual exposure. At the automated packaging warehouse, the remaining second gap is that a device has an identified vulnerability but its vendor update cannot be applied until the next outage, even though inspection cannot identify a command in encrypted application traffic because only ciphertext crosses the firewall is covered.
D:The first substitution fails because storing more ciphertext does not create visibility into its application-layer command; the second fails because a network workaround does not replace the underlying vendor patch or validate the residual exposure. For this automated packaging warehouse, the first finding is that inspection cannot identify a command in encrypted application traffic because only ciphertext crosses the firewall, while the other is that a device has an identified vulnerability but its vendor update cannot be applied until the next outage; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
Question 34
An audit at the regional pipeline control center finds that the security team needs to distinguish the protocol family in OT traffic from whether a known exploit signature was triggered. The proposed shortcut is to interpret every application identification log as proof of a compromise. Which alternative should the architect approve instead?
- Correlate application-control identification with IPS threat events
- Enable appropriate industrial-protocol IPS inspection on the matching FortiGate policy
- Interpret every application identification log as proof of a compromise
- Remove that unnecessary service from the segment's firewall allowlist
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:In this regional pipeline control center scenario, application detection describes the traffic type while IPS alerts indicate a matching malicious pattern; that directly resolves the requirement that the security team needs to distinguish the protocol family in OT traffic from whether a known exploit signature was triggered.
Incorrect Answers
B:At the regional pipeline control center, this mechanism serves the separate situation where the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected, whereas the present finding is that the security team needs to distinguish the protocol family in OT traffic from whether a known exploit signature was triggered; although an OT-aware IPS signature can evaluate malicious commands or exploit patterns beyond just the transport port, the required capability remains missing.
C:At the regional pipeline control center, this substitutes a measure addressing a different concern: normal identified industrial traffic is not equivalent to a detected attack; it leaves unresolved the finding that the security team needs to distinguish the protocol family in OT traffic from whether a known exploit signature was triggered.
D:At the regional pipeline control center, this mechanism serves the separate situation where the OT architect needs to reduce the attack surface of a specific protocol service that is not required by the process, whereas the present finding is that the security team needs to distinguish the protocol family in OT traffic from whether a known exploit signature was triggered; although eliminating unneeded permitted services shrinks reachable attack paths independently of signature coverage, the required capability remains missing.
Question 35
During a scheduled commissioning review at a solar power operations center, (1) operations want an alert when a specific industrial IPS signature appears in FortiGate traffic logs; and (2) a security team wants evidence related to its baseline CIS Controls implementation. Which proposal would pass both acceptance tests with the fewest irrelevant changes?
- Rely only on a summary report that runs once a quarter; then use the appropriate CIS Controls Security Rating report and review its underlying checks
- Rely only on a summary report that runs once a quarter; then interpret an antivirus signature count as a CIS compliance certificate
- Build a FortiAnalyzer event handler filtered for the relevant OT threat log fields; then use the appropriate CIS Controls Security Rating report and review its underlying checks
- Build a FortiAnalyzer event handler filtered for the relevant OT threat log fields; then interpret an antivirus signature count as a CIS compliance certificate
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The first control fits because event handlers evaluate selected logs and generate actionable events when their conditions match; the second fits because CIS-aligned ratings summarize the evaluated security controls rather than proving unrestricted compliance. Together they resolve the separate findings at the solar power operations center: operations want an alert when a specific industrial IPS signature appears in FortiGate traffic logs, and a security team wants evidence related to its baseline CIS Controls implementation. This addresses operations want an alert when a specific industrial IPS signature appears in FortiGate traffic logs without bypassing the separate requirement that a security team wants evidence related to its baseline CIS Controls implementation.
Incorrect Answers
A:The second part is useful because CIS-aligned ratings summarize the evaluated security controls rather than proving unrestricted compliance; however, the first part fails because a retrospective report is not a timely signature-triggered alert. The first gap remains unresolved at the solar power operations center: operations want an alert when a specific industrial IPS signature appears in FortiGate traffic logs; the second measure helps with a security team wants evidence related to its baseline CIS Controls implementation but cannot repair it.
B:The first substitution fails because a retrospective report is not a timely signature-triggered alert; the second fails because update counts do not assess all of the control areas needed for a security rating. For this solar power operations center, the first finding is that operations want an alert when a specific industrial IPS signature appears in FortiGate traffic logs, while the other is that a security team wants evidence related to its baseline CIS Controls implementation; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
D:The first action is suitable because event handlers evaluate selected logs and generate actionable events when their conditions match; the second is misdirected because update counts do not assess all of the control areas needed for a security rating. At the solar power operations center, the remaining second gap is that a security team wants evidence related to its baseline CIS Controls implementation, even though operations want an alert when a specific industrial IPS signature appears in FortiGate traffic logs is covered.
Question 36
The food-processing factory is preparing a controlled rollout. One outstanding requirement is that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access. What is the most targeted response?
- Integrate a supported remote authentication provider and map the appropriate user group
- Apply identity-aware firewall rules using the authenticated user group
- Align firewall authorizations with up-to-date user group membership and session handling
- Leave a permanent all-contractor subnet allow rule as a fallback
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:At the food-processing factory, revocation must be reflected in both identity state and effective policy for the access path; that directly resolves the requirement that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access.
Incorrect Answers
A:At the food-processing factory, this mechanism serves the separate situation where the plant uses a centralized directory and wants to authenticate named engineers without maintaining separate local passwords on each firewall, whereas the present finding is that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access; although centralized identity can validate named users and keep role-based policies aligned with directory membership, the required capability remains missing.
B:At the food-processing factory, this mechanism serves the separate situation where firewall policy should authorize a named maintenance group rather than every endpoint on the engineering subnet, whereas the present finding is that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access; although group-scoped authorization links a verified human identity to the permitted network session, the required capability remains missing.
D:At the food-processing factory, the expected mechanism is absent because an IP-only bypass defeats centralized deprovisioning and least privilege; it leaves unresolved the finding that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access.
Question 37
During an OT readiness check at the natural-gas compression station, the SOC receives too many low-confidence industrial IPS matches on a fragile production segment. What is the most targeted response?
- Correlate application-control identification with IPS threat events
- Tune relevant signatures using evidence and staged monitoring before changing actions
- Apply the sensor to the actual matching firewall policy and confirm policy hits
- Disable all industrial IPS inspection permanently
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:In this natural-gas compression station scenario, narrowly targeted tuning can lower false positives without disabling unrelated protective coverage; that directly resolves the requirement that the SOC receives too many low-confidence industrial IPS matches on a fragile production segment.
Incorrect Answers
A:At the natural-gas compression station, this mechanism serves the separate situation where the security team needs to distinguish the protocol family in OT traffic from whether a known exploit signature was triggered, whereas the present finding is that the SOC receives too many low-confidence industrial IPS matches on a fragile production segment; although application detection describes the traffic type while IPS alerts indicate a matching malicious pattern, the required capability remains missing.
C:At the natural-gas compression station, this mechanism serves the separate situation where a policy has an OT application sensor configured but traffic is governed by a different matching firewall rule, whereas the present finding is that the SOC receives too many low-confidence industrial IPS matches on a fragile production segment; although security profiles act on traffic traversing the enabled policy, not merely on the profile object existing, the required capability remains missing.
D:At the natural-gas compression station, this substitutes a measure addressing a different concern: global disablement discards protection against other exploit classes along with the noisy match; it leaves unresolved the finding that the SOC receives too many low-confidence industrial IPS matches on a fragile production segment.
Question 38
During an OT readiness check at the offshore pumping platform, automatic quarantine could interrupt production safety if every low-severity alert directly isolates a PLC. What is the most targeted response?
- Target the affected noncritical endpoint through FortiNAC or policy-based access restriction
- Quarantine every controller on its first informational signature match
- Connect a validated event handler to a controlled automation response
- Gate isolation actions with confidence, asset criticality and operations approval
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:In this offshore pumping platform scenario, OT response automation needs safeguards so ambiguous detections do not unnecessarily stop control functions; that directly resolves the requirement that automatic quarantine could interrupt production safety if every low-severity alert directly isolates a PLC.
Incorrect Answers
A:At the offshore pumping platform, this mechanism serves the separate situation where a suspected compromised maintenance laptop must be contained while continuing operation of fixed safety controllers, whereas the present finding is that automatic quarantine could interrupt production safety if every low-severity alert directly isolates a PLC; although containment should act on the identified workstation rather than remove an entire safety-critical control cell, the required capability remains missing.
B:At the offshore pumping platform, this substitutes a measure addressing a different concern: unconditional isolation can create unsafe availability consequences from false positives; it leaves unresolved the finding that automatic quarantine could interrupt production safety if every low-severity alert directly isolates a PLC.
C:At the offshore pumping platform, this mechanism serves the separate situation where a FortiAnalyzer OT detection must trigger a predefined review or quarantine workflow without a human manually exporting logs, whereas the present finding is that automatic quarantine could interrupt production safety if every low-severity alert directly isolates a PLC; although event-driven response can feed an approved containment action from the detection context, the required capability remains missing.
Question 39
The plant cybersecurity team at the cement kiln control room has two narrowly scoped objectives: (1) the process historian may only initiate read requests to certain controllers and arbitrary writes are prohibited; and (2) FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN. Which two measures correctly map to the operational and security requirements?
- Restrict the approved traffic at the correct conduit using protocol-aware controls where available; then enable an unrelated email alert while leaving the switch VLAN missing
- Permit every function of the industrial protocol because its TCP port is known; then enable an unrelated email alert while leaving the switch VLAN missing
- Permit every function of the industrial protocol because its TCP port is known; then configure and map the restriction VLAN on the controlled switch before enforcing port changes
- Restrict the approved traffic at the correct conduit using protocol-aware controls where available; then configure and map the restriction VLAN on the controlled switch before enforcing port changes
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The first control fits because limiting communications by destination and industrial operation reduces the blast radius of unauthorized commands; the second fits because access enforcement depends on the switching infrastructure actually supporting the intended restricted VLAN. Together they resolve the separate findings at the cement kiln control room: the process historian may only initiate read requests to certain controllers and arbitrary writes are prohibited, and FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN. This addresses the process historian may only initiate read requests to certain controllers and arbitrary writes are prohibited without bypassing the separate requirement that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first action is suitable because limiting communications by destination and industrial operation reduces the blast radius of unauthorized commands; the second is misdirected because notification does not supply a usable layer-two quarantine destination. At the cement kiln control room, the remaining second gap is that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN, even though the process historian may only initiate read requests to certain controllers and arbitrary writes are prohibited is covered.
B:The first substitution fails because a port-level permit alone does not distinguish safe read operations from dangerous writes; the second fails because notification does not supply a usable layer-two quarantine destination. For this cement kiln control room, the first finding is that the process historian may only initiate read requests to certain controllers and arbitrary writes are prohibited, while the other is that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
C:The second part is useful because access enforcement depends on the switching infrastructure actually supporting the intended restricted VLAN; however, the first part fails because a port-level permit alone does not distinguish safe read operations from dangerous writes. The first gap remains unresolved at the cement kiln control room: the process historian may only initiate read requests to certain controllers and arbitrary writes are prohibited; the second measure helps with FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN but cannot repair it.
Question 40
The asset owner of the wastewater pumping station wants to correct both of these deficiencies: (1) analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule; and (2) users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN. What is the technically justified combination for the two separate observations?
- Enable more logging on the narrow rule while leaving the higher matching policy in place; then substitute MAC registration as proof of the current human user
- Enable more logging on the narrow rule while leaving the higher matching policy in place; then use FortiNAC forced authentication on the relevant ports
- Examine policy order and actual policy-hit or traffic logs; then substitute MAC registration as proof of the current human user
- Use separate FortiGate VDOMs with appropriate inter-VDOM boundaries; then use FortiNAC forced authentication on the relevant ports
- Examine policy order and actual policy-hit or traffic logs; then use FortiNAC forced authentication on the relevant ports
Explanation
Correct Answer
E:The first control fits because FortiGate evaluates the applicable policy and a preceding broad match can shadow a narrow intended rule; the second fits because the isolated state can persist until a verified user authenticates to release the port. Together they resolve the separate findings at the wastewater pumping station: analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule, and users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN. This addresses analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule without bypassing the separate requirement that users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first substitution fails because extra logging on a shadowed rule does not make traffic select that rule ahead of an earlier match; the second fails because a registered device does not establish which individual is logged on. For this wastewater pumping station, the first finding is that analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule, while the other is that users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
B:The second part is useful because the isolated state can persist until a verified user authenticates to release the port; however, the first part fails because extra logging on a shadowed rule does not make traffic select that rule ahead of an earlier match. The first gap remains unresolved at the wastewater pumping station: analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule; the second measure helps with users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN but cannot repair it.
C:The first action is suitable because FortiGate evaluates the applicable policy and a preceding broad match can shadow a narrow intended rule; the second is misdirected because a registered device does not establish which individual is logged on. At the wastewater pumping station, the remaining second gap is that users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN, even though analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule is covered.
D:The second action addresses users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN because the isolated state can persist until a verified user authenticates to release the port, but the separate first finding still concerns analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule. The proposed first mechanism belongs to a different requirement: the security team must keep two production units' routing tables and firewall administration separate on shared hardware; VDOM isolation separates routing and policy contexts rather than merely giving interfaces different labels, but despite the valid second control for users on registered workstations need to authenticate before the access port returns to a production VLAN, it does not resolve the first finding at the wastewater pumping station: analysts must confirm that a firewall rule for an HMI to one PLC is being used rather than a broader earlier rule.