Question 860
A security assessment of the natural-gas compression station records two issues: (1) sensors at a process-control layer must be visible to the SOC without exposing those sensors directly to the enterprise LAN; and (2) the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures. Which two measures correctly map to the operational and security requirements?
- Collect telemetry through approved segmented collectors and controlled boundary paths; then assume a default route alone proves OT signature licensing
- Collect telemetry through approved segmented collectors and controlled boundary paths; then check the Operational Technology Security Service entitlement under FortiGuard subscriptions
- Permit unrestricted enterprise access directly to the controller subnet; then check the Operational Technology Security Service entitlement under FortiGuard subscriptions
- Permit unrestricted enterprise access directly to the controller subnet; then assume a default route alone proves OT signature licensing
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The first control fits because controlled information flows preserve OT segmentation while supplying analysis outside sensitive control segments; the second fits because license entitlement governs access to the dedicated OT security signature updates. Together they resolve the separate findings at the natural-gas compression station: sensors at a process-control layer must be visible to the SOC without exposing those sensors directly to the enterprise LAN, and the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures. This addresses sensors at a process-control layer must be visible to the SOC without exposing those sensors directly to the enterprise LAN without bypassing the separate requirement that the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first action is suitable because controlled information flows preserve OT segmentation while supplying analysis outside sensitive control segments; the second is misdirected because Internet reachability by itself does not activate a subscription that has not been licensed. At the natural-gas compression station, the remaining second gap is that the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures, even though sensors at a process-control layer must be visible to the SOC without exposing those sensors directly to the enterprise LAN is covered.
C:The second part is useful because license entitlement governs access to the dedicated OT security signature updates; however, the first part fails because broad inbound reachability enlarges the exposure of assets intended to remain isolated. The first gap remains unresolved at the natural-gas compression station: sensors at a process-control layer must be visible to the SOC without exposing those sensors directly to the enterprise LAN; the second measure helps with the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures but cannot repair it.
D:The first substitution fails because broad inbound reachability enlarges the exposure of assets intended to remain isolated; the second fails because Internet reachability by itself does not activate a subscription that has not been licensed. For this natural-gas compression station, the first finding is that sensors at a process-control layer must be visible to the SOC without exposing those sensors directly to the enterprise LAN, while the other is that the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
Question 861
The controls engineer and SOC analyst for the automated packaging warehouse must jointly address the following: (1) a plant wants to check whether an emergency data route bypasses its intended industrial DMZ; and (2) the plant must preserve the identity and connection history of a registered technician workstation for access investigations. Which joint design is aligned with the exact detection and enforcement gaps?
- Verify the implemented path against the defined OT zones and boundary policy; then replace the host record with a static switch-port label
- Assume any route with low latency is authorized; then replace the host record with a static switch-port label
- Verify the implemented path against the defined OT zones and boundary policy; then maintain the endpoint in FortiNAC Host View with appropriate user association
- Assume any route with low latency is authorized; then maintain the endpoint in FortiNAC Host View with appropriate user association
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The first control fits because comparing actual network paths with approved conduits reveals ungoverned enterprise-to-control bypasses; the second fits because Host View preserves host and connection context needed for accountability and access workflows. Together they resolve the separate findings at the automated packaging warehouse: a plant wants to check whether an emergency data route bypasses its intended industrial DMZ, and the plant must preserve the identity and connection history of a registered technician workstation for access investigations. This addresses a plant wants to check whether an emergency data route bypasses its intended industrial DMZ without bypassing the separate requirement that the plant must preserve the identity and connection history of a registered technician workstation for access investigations.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first action is suitable because comparing actual network paths with approved conduits reveals ungoverned enterprise-to-control bypasses; the second is misdirected because a port description does not retain host history or link the observed endpoint with an accountable user. At the automated packaging warehouse, the remaining second gap is that the plant must preserve the identity and connection history of a registered technician workstation for access investigations, even though a plant wants to check whether an emergency data route bypasses its intended industrial DMZ is covered.
B:The first substitution fails because acceptable response time does not establish that a cross-zone path meets security requirements; the second fails because a port description does not retain host history or link the observed endpoint with an accountable user. For this automated packaging warehouse, the first finding is that a plant wants to check whether an emergency data route bypasses its intended industrial DMZ, while the other is that the plant must preserve the identity and connection history of a registered technician workstation for access investigations; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
D:The second part is useful because Host View preserves host and connection context needed for accountability and access workflows; however, the first part fails because acceptable response time does not establish that a cross-zone path meets security requirements. The first gap remains unresolved at the automated packaging warehouse: a plant wants to check whether an emergency data route bypasses its intended industrial DMZ; the second measure helps with the plant must preserve the identity and connection history of a registered technician workstation for access investigations but cannot repair it.
Question 862
Before the food-processing factory accepts a proposed OT security architecture, it must demonstrate: (1) a FortiGate LAN interface sees OT hosts but device identity collection is disabled on that interface; and (2) device classification based only on vendor OUI confuses similar products from the same manufacturer. Which joint design is aligned with the exact detection and enforcement gaps?
- Enable device identification on the relevant FortiGate LAN interface; then force every endpoint from one OUI into a single controller class
- Enable device identification on the relevant FortiGate LAN interface; then refine FortiNAC profiling rules with additional observed attributes and higher-specificity criteria
- Enable only historical traffic-log report scheduling; then force every endpoint from one OUI into a single controller class
- Enable only historical traffic-log report scheduling; then refine FortiNAC profiling rules with additional observed attributes and higher-specificity criteria
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The first control fits because interface-level device-identification allows passive gathering of identity information from observed devices; the second fits because the MAC vendor prefix is only a partial clue and stronger profile criteria reduce false classifications. Together they resolve the separate findings at the food-processing factory: a FortiGate LAN interface sees OT hosts but device identity collection is disabled on that interface, and device classification based only on vendor OUI confuses similar products from the same manufacturer. This addresses a FortiGate LAN interface sees OT hosts but device identity collection is disabled on that interface without bypassing the separate requirement that device classification based only on vendor OUI confuses similar products from the same manufacturer.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first action is suitable because interface-level device-identification allows passive gathering of identity information from observed devices; the second is misdirected because shared manufacturer identifiers cannot reliably distinguish different endpoint functions. At the food-processing factory, the remaining second gap is that device classification based only on vendor OUI confuses similar products from the same manufacturer, even though a FortiGate LAN interface sees OT hosts but device identity collection is disabled on that interface is covered.
C:The first substitution fails because reports summarize recorded traffic but do not activate interface-based device identification; the second fails because shared manufacturer identifiers cannot reliably distinguish different endpoint functions. For this food-processing factory, the first finding is that a FortiGate LAN interface sees OT hosts but device identity collection is disabled on that interface, while the other is that device classification based only on vendor OUI confuses similar products from the same manufacturer; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
D:The second part is useful because the MAC vendor prefix is only a partial clue and stronger profile criteria reduce false classifications; however, the first part fails because reports summarize recorded traffic but do not activate interface-based device identification. The first gap remains unresolved at the food-processing factory: a FortiGate LAN interface sees OT hosts but device identity collection is disabled on that interface; the second measure helps with device classification based only on vendor OUI confuses similar products from the same manufacturer but cannot repair it.
Question 863
A semiconductor fabrication facility is reviewing three separate OT control failures: first, SOC analysts need a consolidated trend of control-network alerts across multiple sites; second, controls engineers cannot patch an essential controller until the next shutdown and the risk must be accepted or mitigated formally; and third, managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs. Which THREE individual measures correctly address these distinct failures? Choose THREE.
- Schedule and scope a FortiAnalyzer report using appropriate OT datasets
- Export the firewall's unfiltered current session table once
- Document compensating controls, owner approval and a time-bound residual-risk plan
- Create a scoped FortiSIEM dashboard using normalized incidents and relevant time filters
- Treat a static switch configuration backup as an incident dashboard
- Delete the vulnerability ticket once maintenance is postponed
Explanation
Correct Answers
A:In this semiconductor fabrication facility scenario, reports aggregate retained security data into a repeatable operational review artifact; that directly resolves the requirement that managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs; it is evaluated alongside the separate requirement that SOC analysts need a consolidated trend of control-network alerts across multiple sites.
C:The relevant technical distinction for the semiconductor fabrication facility is that deferred firmware fixes require explicit accountability and interim network controls; that directly resolves the requirement that controls engineers cannot patch an essential controller until the next shutdown and the risk must be accepted or mitigated formally; it is evaluated alongside the separate requirement that managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs.
D:At the semiconductor fabrication facility, role-focused dashboards summarize correlated events while retaining drill-down into source evidence; that directly resolves the requirement that SOC analysts need a consolidated trend of control-network alerts across multiple sites; it is evaluated alongside the separate requirement that controls engineers cannot patch an essential controller until the next shutdown and the risk must be accepted or mitigated formally.
Incorrect Answers
B:At the semiconductor fabrication facility, this substitutes a measure addressing a different concern: a one-time active-session snapshot is not a historical threat trend report; it leaves unresolved the finding that managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs; the parallel design also has to address SOC analysts need a consolidated trend of control-network alerts across multiple sites.
E:At the semiconductor fabrication facility, the expected mechanism is absent because a network configuration archive is not an analytics view of time-varying threats; it leaves unresolved the finding that SOC analysts need a consolidated trend of control-network alerts across multiple sites; the parallel design also has to address controls engineers cannot patch an essential controller until the next shutdown and the risk must be accepted or mitigated formally.
F:The mismatch at the semiconductor fabrication facility is specific to the observed control requirement: closing the record without a treatment plan loses ownership of the remaining hazard; it leaves unresolved the finding that controls engineers cannot patch an essential controller until the next shutdown and the risk must be accepted or mitigated formally; the parallel design also has to address managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs.
Question 864
The operations and security teams for the solar power operations center agree on these acceptance criteria: (1) traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain; and (2) the security team must keep two production units' routing tables and firewall administration separate on shared hardware. Which proposal fixes both issues while leaving unrelated OT workloads alone?
- Install a router ACL while retaining the original shared layer-two segment; then use separate FortiGate VDOMs with appropriate inter-VDOM boundaries
- Define distinct VLANs for the engineering and control populations; then create two address objects inside one unrestricted policy set
- Install a router ACL while retaining the original shared layer-two segment; then create two address objects inside one unrestricted policy set
- Define distinct VLANs for the engineering and control populations; then use separate FortiGate VDOMs with appropriate inter-VDOM boundaries
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The first control fits because VLAN separation limits layer-two broadcast reach and enables more explicit inter-VLAN policy boundaries; the second fits because VDOM isolation separates routing and policy contexts rather than merely giving interfaces different labels. Together they resolve the separate findings at the solar power operations center: traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain, and the security team must keep two production units' routing tables and firewall administration separate on shared hardware. This addresses traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain without bypassing the separate requirement that the security team must keep two production units' routing tables and firewall administration separate on shared hardware.
Incorrect Answers
A:The second part is useful because VDOM isolation separates routing and policy contexts rather than merely giving interfaces different labels; however, the first part fails because a routed ACL may filter subnet crossings but does not split a common layer-two broadcast domain. The first gap remains unresolved at the solar power operations center: traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain; the second measure helps with the security team must keep two production units' routing tables and firewall administration separate on shared hardware but cannot repair it.
B:The first action is suitable because VLAN separation limits layer-two broadcast reach and enables more explicit inter-VLAN policy boundaries; the second is misdirected because address objects alone do not create separate forwarding or administrative instances. At the solar power operations center, the remaining second gap is that the security team must keep two production units' routing tables and firewall administration separate on shared hardware, even though traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain is covered.
C:The first substitution fails because a routed ACL may filter subnet crossings but does not split a common layer-two broadcast domain; the second fails because address objects alone do not create separate forwarding or administrative instances. For this solar power operations center, the first finding is that traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain, while the other is that the security team must keep two production units' routing tables and firewall administration separate on shared hardware; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
Question 865
For the upcoming controlled rollout at the district heating plant, the work package includes: (1) the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected; and (2) the SOC wants to verify that an exploit was mitigated by the intended protection policy rather than by endpoint downtime. Which joint design is aligned with the exact detection and enforcement gaps?
- Enable appropriate industrial-protocol IPS inspection on the matching FortiGate policy; then infer successful virtual patching from the absence of all traffic
- Use only a destination-port allow rule with no inspection profile; then correlate threat action, policy identity and reachability evidence during a safe validation
- Use only a destination-port allow rule with no inspection profile; then infer successful virtual patching from the absence of all traffic
- Enable appropriate industrial-protocol IPS inspection on the matching FortiGate policy; then correlate threat action, policy identity and reachability evidence during a safe validation
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The first control fits because an OT-aware IPS signature can evaluate malicious commands or exploit patterns beyond just the transport port; the second fits because documented policy hits and blocked detections distinguish intended mitigation from an unavailable controller. Together they resolve the separate findings at the district heating plant: the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected, and the SOC wants to verify that an exploit was mitigated by the intended protection policy rather than by endpoint downtime. This addresses the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected without bypassing the separate requirement that the SOC wants to verify that an exploit was mitigated by the intended protection policy rather than by endpoint downtime.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first action is suitable because an OT-aware IPS signature can evaluate malicious commands or exploit patterns beyond just the transport port; the second is misdirected because an idle or disconnected endpoint can produce silence even when the mitigation is not configured. At the district heating plant, the remaining second gap is that the SOC wants to verify that an exploit was mitigated by the intended protection policy rather than by endpoint downtime, even though the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected is covered.
B:The second part is useful because documented policy hits and blocked detections distinguish intended mitigation from an unavailable controller; however, the first part fails because a transport permit has no intrinsic understanding of payload-level exploit indicators. The first gap remains unresolved at the district heating plant: the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected; the second measure helps with the SOC wants to verify that an exploit was mitigated by the intended protection policy rather than by endpoint downtime but cannot repair it.
C:The first substitution fails because a transport permit has no intrinsic understanding of payload-level exploit indicators; the second fails because an idle or disconnected endpoint can produce silence even when the mitigation is not configured. For this district heating plant, the first finding is that the firewall permits an industrial TCP port but a malicious operation within that protocol remains undetected, while the other is that the SOC wants to verify that an exploit was mitigated by the intended protection policy rather than by endpoint downtime; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
Question 866
At an industrial refrigeration installation, engineers must address both of these documented gaps: (1) the compliance workshop asks for a documented risk-based control approach to OT system security under ISA/IEC 62443; and (2) the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures. Which TWO independently necessary controls directly fulfill the two requirements? Choose TWO.
- Identify applicable BES Cyber Systems and evaluate relevant NERC CIP requirements
- Assume a default route alone proves OT signature licensing
- Check the Operational Technology Security Service entitlement under FortiGuard subscriptions
- Declare the entire production LAN compliant because it has a perimeter firewall
- Define zone-specific security requirements and assess the conduits connecting them
Explanation
Correct Answers
C:For the stated gap at the industrial refrigeration installation, license entitlement governs access to the dedicated OT security signature updates; that directly resolves the requirement that the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures; it is evaluated alongside the separate requirement that the compliance workshop asks for a documented risk-based control approach to OT system security under ISA/IEC 62443.
E:In this industrial refrigeration installation scenario, ISA/IEC 62443 promotes risk-informed partitioning and explicitly governed communications across trust boundaries; that directly resolves the requirement that the compliance workshop asks for a documented risk-based control approach to OT system security under ISA/IEC 62443; it is evaluated alongside the separate requirement that the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures.
Incorrect Answers
A:At the industrial refrigeration installation, this mechanism serves the separate situation where a North American electric utility needs to relate its cyber-system inventory and perimeter protections to the applicable NERC CIP obligations, whereas the present finding is that the compliance workshop asks for a documented risk-based control approach to OT system security under ISA/IEC 62443; although applicability and asset classification determine which NERC CIP safeguards must be assessed for the electric utility, the required capability remains missing.
B:At the industrial refrigeration installation, that alternative is insufficient because Internet reachability by itself does not activate a subscription that has not been licensed; it leaves unresolved the finding that the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures; the parallel design also has to address the compliance workshop asks for a documented risk-based control approach to OT system security under ISA/IEC 62443.
D:At the industrial refrigeration installation, this substitutes a measure addressing a different concern: one perimeter device cannot demonstrate zone-level requirements or govern all lateral paths; it leaves unresolved the finding that the compliance workshop asks for a documented risk-based control approach to OT system security under ISA/IEC 62443; the parallel design also has to address the administrator must verify whether the dedicated FortiGuard OT signature service is entitled before expecting OT-specific signatures.
Question 867
A post-installation check at the glass manufacturing line finds two outstanding configuration gaps: (1) a compromised historian should not be able to initiate sessions to peer PLCs inside the same operational area; and (2) the security review demands auditable separation between identity verification and permission to operate a controller. What two-part implementation is the most precise response to the stated requirements?
- Inspect only traffic leaving the company for the Internet; then treat a successful password check as permission for all industrial commands
- Inspect only traffic leaving the company for the Internet; then record the authentication source and narrowly scoped authorization policy separately
- Introduce internal segmentation rules on actual historian-to-PLC forwarding paths; then treat a successful password check as permission for all industrial commands
- Introduce internal segmentation rules on actual historian-to-PLC forwarding paths; then record the authentication source and narrowly scoped authorization policy separately
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The first control fits because restricting east-west flows contains lateral movement that perimeter-only inspection would not see; the second fits because proving who a person is and determining what that person may access are distinct security decisions. Together they resolve the separate findings at the glass manufacturing line: a compromised historian should not be able to initiate sessions to peer PLCs inside the same operational area, and the security review demands auditable separation between identity verification and permission to operate a controller. This addresses a compromised historian should not be able to initiate sessions to peer PLCs inside the same operational area without bypassing the separate requirement that the security review demands auditable separation between identity verification and permission to operate a controller.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first substitution fails because external egress policy misses peer-to-peer communications within the industrial environment; the second fails because credential verification alone does not define allowed destinations or permitted actions. For this glass manufacturing line, the first finding is that a compromised historian should not be able to initiate sessions to peer PLCs inside the same operational area, while the other is that the security review demands auditable separation between identity verification and permission to operate a controller; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
B:The second part is useful because proving who a person is and determining what that person may access are distinct security decisions; however, the first part fails because external egress policy misses peer-to-peer communications within the industrial environment. The first gap remains unresolved at the glass manufacturing line: a compromised historian should not be able to initiate sessions to peer PLCs inside the same operational area; the second measure helps with the security review demands auditable separation between identity verification and permission to operate a controller but cannot repair it.
C:The first action is suitable because restricting east-west flows contains lateral movement that perimeter-only inspection would not see; the second is misdirected because credential verification alone does not define allowed destinations or permitted actions. At the glass manufacturing line, the remaining second gap is that the security review demands auditable separation between identity verification and permission to operate a controller, even though a compromised historian should not be able to initiate sessions to peer PLCs inside the same operational area is covered.
Question 868
An OT architect reviewing the cement kiln control room observes two independent gaps: (1) analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover; and (2) managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs. Which proposal would pass both acceptance tests with the fewest irrelevant changes?
- Send an incident-count summary without the underlying case event details; then export the firewall's unfiltered current session table once
- Adjust precise handler conditions and expected maintenance exceptions with review; then schedule and scope a FortiAnalyzer report using appropriate OT datasets
- Use the supported incident export capability and retain relevant case evidence; then schedule and scope a FortiAnalyzer report using appropriate OT datasets
- Use the supported incident export capability and retain relevant case evidence; then export the firewall's unfiltered current session table once
- Send an incident-count summary without the underlying case event details; then schedule and scope a FortiAnalyzer report using appropriate OT datasets
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The first control fits because exporting an incident allows accountable transfer without relying on an ephemeral dashboard view; the second fits because reports aggregate retained security data into a repeatable operational review artifact. Together they resolve the separate findings at the cement kiln control room: analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover, and managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs. This addresses analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover without bypassing the separate requirement that managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs.
Incorrect Answers
A:The first substitution fails because aggregate totals cannot preserve the event context and supporting evidence required in a handover; the second fails because a one-time active-session snapshot is not a historical threat trend report. For this cement kiln control room, the first finding is that analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover, while the other is that managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs; neither is corrected by the chosen substitutions.
B:The second action addresses managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs because reports aggregate retained security data into a repeatable operational review artifact, but the separate first finding still concerns analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover. The proposed first mechanism belongs to a different requirement: event-volume spikes after a maintenance operation are obscuring genuine OT incidents; narrowly reasoned filters reduce known benign matches while retaining significant detections, but despite the valid second control for managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs, it does not resolve the first finding at the cement kiln control room: analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover.
D:The first action is suitable because exporting an incident allows accountable transfer without relying on an ephemeral dashboard view; the second is misdirected because a one-time active-session snapshot is not a historical threat trend report. At the cement kiln control room, the remaining second gap is that managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs, even though analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover is covered.
E:The second part is useful because reports aggregate retained security data into a repeatable operational review artifact; however, the first part fails because aggregate totals cannot preserve the event context and supporting evidence required in a handover. The first gap remains unresolved at the cement kiln control room: analysts need to preserve a selected OT incident with its investigation context for a handover; the second measure helps with managers need repeated OT threat trends from FortiAnalyzer without manually collecting individual firewall logs but cannot repair it.
Question 869
During troubleshooting of the electric distribution substation, the operator confirms that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN. What is the most targeted response?
- Configure and map the restriction VLAN on the controlled switch before enforcing port changes
- Enable an unrelated email alert while leaving the switch VLAN missing
- Apply FortiNAC role-based network access or matching network access policies
- Configure FortiNAC forced registration with an appropriate registration or isolation VLAN
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:For the stated gap at the electric distribution substation, access enforcement depends on the switching infrastructure actually supporting the intended restricted VLAN; that directly resolves the requirement that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN.
Incorrect Answers
B:At the electric distribution substation, that alternative is insufficient because notification does not supply a usable layer-two quarantine destination; it leaves unresolved the finding that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN.
C:At the electric distribution substation, this mechanism serves the separate situation where the production VLAN should change according to the registered host's assigned industrial role, whereas the present finding is that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN; although the device or host role can drive the resulting VLAN instead of a single shared access state, the required capability remains missing.
D:At the electric distribution substation, this mechanism serves the separate situation where an unregistered maintenance laptop should be unable to join the production VLAN until approved, whereas the present finding is that FortiNAC has identified a rogue device but the managed switch is not configured for the relevant isolation VLAN; although unknown endpoints can be put into a restricted VLAN pending their registration and authorization, the required capability remains missing.
Question 870
At an airport baggage control system, engineers must address both of these documented gaps: (1) traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain; and (2) a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access. Which TWO independently necessary controls directly fulfill the two requirements? Choose TWO.
- Install a router ACL while retaining the original shared layer-two segment
- Validate the industrial redundancy mechanism and the firewall failure behavior together
- Define distinct VLANs for the engineering and control populations
- Leave a permanent all-contractor subnet allow rule as a fallback
- Align firewall authorizations with up-to-date user group membership and session handling
Explanation
Correct Answers
C:In this airport baggage control system scenario, VLAN separation limits layer-two broadcast reach and enables more explicit inter-VLAN policy boundaries; that directly resolves the requirement that traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain; it is evaluated alongside the separate requirement that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access.
E:For the stated gap at the airport baggage control system, revocation must be reflected in both identity state and effective policy for the access path; that directly resolves the requirement that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access; it is evaluated alongside the separate requirement that traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain.
Incorrect Answers
A:At the airport baggage control system, this substitutes a measure addressing a different concern: a routed ACL may filter subnet crossings but does not split a common layer-two broadcast domain; it leaves unresolved the finding that traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain; the parallel design also has to address a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access.
B:At the airport baggage control system, this mechanism serves the separate situation where a ring-topology automation network has stringent recovery-time requirements before a segmentation change, whereas the present finding is that traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain; although acceptable availability depends on convergence and failover characteristics of the whole industrial path, the required capability remains missing.
D:At the airport baggage control system, that alternative is insufficient because an IP-only bypass defeats centralized deprovisioning and least privilege; it leaves unresolved the finding that a contractor account has been removed from the identity provider but an old local allow rule still provides broad access; the parallel design also has to address traffic from an engineer workstation and a safety controller shares one untagged broadcast domain.